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ABSTRACT
Chapter 1: We exploit a federal oil lease lottery to examine how markets correct for initial
misallocation. Lottery participants included oil companies, as well as individuals without the
capital or expertise to drill for oil. In the absence of reallocation, we expect less drilling on leases
won by individuals. We find that leases won by firms and individuals have similar short- and long-
term outcomes, suggesting that secondary markets rapidly and efficiently correct for misallocation
to individuals. However, the small subset of parcels with nearby oil production have 50% less
drilling when they are won by firms. We develop a simple model to demonstrate how information
asymmetry adversely affects firms to a greater degree. Because individuals have larger gains from
trade, they are less likely to have their decision to trade affected by asymmetric information and
are more likely to trade with a nearby producing firm.
Chapter 2: Between 2007 and 2013 the natural gas price dramatically declined, in large part
due to hydraulic fracturing. Lower natural gas prices induced switching from coal generation to
natural gas generation; I find 2013 carbon emissions fell by 14,700 tons/hour as a result. Lower
prices also incentivized new investment in natural gas capacity. The more efficient capital stock
led to an additional decrease of 2,100 tons/hour in 2013. I estimate 65-85% of this new capacity
was constructed because of lower gas prices. Using a social cost of carbon of $35/ton, I value the
total decrease at roughly $5.1 billion.
Chapter 3: We examine the relationship between airfares and oil prices in the Australian air-
line industry. We find pass-through rates in excess of 100% that vary depending on the amount
of competition on a route. We also find evidence that different types of products can have hetero-
geneous pass-through structures – pass-through rates on non-stop routes are more responsive to
competition than on one-stop routes. Our results have important implications for environmental
policy in industries with imperfect competition and differentiated products.
xi
Chapter 1
To Trade or Not to Trade:
Oil Leases, Information Asymmetry, and Coase
(With Eric Lewis)
1.1 Introduction
The Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960) suggests that, in the absence of frictions, initial asset misalloca-
tion should be corrected through secondary market trading. Information asymmetry is one type of
friction that can disrupt reallocation (Akerlof, 1970; Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983; Hendricks
and Porter, 1988). Our paper seeks to answer two related questions. First, in the absence of large
frictions, can we find evidence that initially misallocated assets can quickly and efficiently be re-
allocated, as the Coase Theorem predicts? Second, does the presence of information asymmetry
change our results?
We examine a 1970’s oil (and gas) lease lottery that only cost $10 per lease to enter1, allowing
many different individuals and firms to enter the lottery. While winning oil firms had the capacity to
exploit their leases, winning individuals likely lacked the necessary capital and expertise. Many of
these individuals entered the lottery with the intent of flipping their winnings to firms and securing
a quick profit, but were likely poor initial matches for the drilling rights. We hypothesize that in
the absence of secondary markets, parcels won by firms would have seen much more development.
We test whether initial misallocation to individuals (instead of firms) as a result of the lottery
led to short- and medium-run differences in drilling and production. While assignment via lottery
provides exogenous variation conditional on entry, we also need to correct for potential bias from
1$10 in 1975-1978 is worth about $41 in 2015.
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endogenous entry. Indeed, our data show that firms and individuals submit entries for different
types of leases at different rates. We use two strategies to control for bias from endogenous entry.
Our first strategy uses the fact that each lease had three “winners”, a first-place winner that
actually claimed the lease, as well as two back-up winners. We examine a restricted set of parcels
where exactly one of the three winners is a firm. Within this subsample, knowing the identity of
the initial winner provides no information about the underlying characteristics of a lease. As a
result, we can estimate an unbiased treatment effect from having a firm win a lease. Our second
strategy uses the full set of parcels and relies on observables to control for bias from endogenous
entry. Results are broadly consistent across our two specifications.
Consistent with the Coase Theorem, we find that leases without information asymmetry are
likely to be reallocated, resulting in similar ex-post probabilities of drilling and production for
leases won by firms and those won by individuals. This finding provides evidence in favor of the
efficiency of secondary markets that contrasts with a recent literature (Bleakley and Ferrie, 2014;
Akee, 2009). Their papers show that correcting for initial market mismatches takes anywhere from
20 to 100 years, while our paper shows that reallocation can allow outcomes to be very similar in
the immediate term.
Our findings likely differ from the existing literature because of the relative ease of correcting
for initial misallocation in our setting. Underlying lease characteristics in our sample started out
identical, in expectation; the previous literature examined convergence when assets started out
with different underlying characteristics. Additionally, the deep pool of interested parties, reliable
(if limited) information about leases, and the relative ease of contacting lessees all likely aided
secondary market reallocation.
A subset of leases in our sample have nearby oil production. This nearby oil production pro-
vides private information to the nearby producer about the quality of their land, as well as the
quality of nearby land. Private information creates a lemons problem and makes it difficult for
parties to agree on a fair transfer price. Indeed, Wiggins and Libecap (1985) find that informa-
tion asymmetry from nearby production impedes unitization on oil fields that are being developed
because parties are unable to agree on how to share oil production.
We find that leases with nearby production have about twice as much drilling and production
if they are initially allocated to individuals, as opposed to firms. This result is likely caused by
individuals’ greater propensity to reassign their leases to nearby producing firms that can make the
best decisions about whether to drill on the land. Analysis of reassignment patterns confirms that
firms are less likely than individuals to trade with nearby producing firms.
2
In order to more formally understand our results, we develop a simple theoretical model of lease
reassignment and drilling that is based in part on Myerson (1985); Samuelson (1985). Information
asymmetry in the model works to prevent trade because uninformed parties know that informed
parties will only agree to a trade if the latter are paying a price at or below the fair market value
– there is limited upside to engaging in trade for the uninformed party. The intuition of the model
is that gains from trading with a nearby producing firm are larger for individuals, causing them
to be more likely to overcome information asymmetry. Because nearby producing firms have
information about the quality of the lease, they are better able to identify the best leases to drill.
On the other hand, firms that retain leases they initially win are unable to internalize the nearby
firms’ information about their lease, causing them to be less likely to drill.
Our work improves the understanding of how (mineral lease) secondary markets reallocate as-
sets. This is particularly relevant today because current fracking hotspots have a similar structure
to the Wyoming oil lease lottery. For example, oil deposits in the Bakken shale were allocated
haphazardly, from the perspective of farmers who were not expecting to drill for oil. In addi-
tion to similarities in the allocation process, the reallocation process remains comparable - direct
negotiations between landowners and firms interested in buying drilling rights.
We also contribute to the understanding how asymmetric information can impede otherwise
efficient market design. In the absence of information asymmetry and in the presence of a robust
secondary market, our work suggests that initial allocations may not be important. However, the
presence of information asymmetry suggests that it is better to initially allocate an asset to some-
body who cannot use it than it is to allocate the same asset to a random firm (if there is a robust
secondary market). While the former allocation type is initially worse, secondary markets are bet-
ter able to correct for this mismatch because the gains from trade are larger. This ties to theoretical
work by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showing that when the range of typical seller valuations
does not overlap with the range of typical buyer valuations, efficient trade can occur that is both
individually rational and incentive compatible—even though buyers and sellers still have uncer-
tainty about each other’s valuations. Our results demonstrate a novel way of avoiding information
asymmetry problems – allocate assets to owners who must trade them.2
Finally, we demonstrate that under certain conditions (information symmetry and a robust sec-
ondary market), lotteries can be a relatively efficient way of allocating public resources. In addition
to oil and gas, many other natural resources (timber, coal, water, etc.), as well as spectrum, Inter-
2Our work also ties to a strand of corporate finance literature showing that information asymmetry problems can be
mitigated by bank-imposed opacity (for example, Dang et al. (2017) show that bank-imposed opacity promotes asset
liquidity).
3
net domain names, and carbon permits are public resources that could be allocated via lottery.3
Many economists would suggest that an auction is a superior method of allocating resources. Our
results suggest that the efficiency cost of lotteries is lower than expected in some settings. Indeed,
lotteries with a robust secondary market could be a preferable form of allocation if they are less
costly to implement than an auction, if they are seen as a more equitable way of distributing public
resources, or if they generate higher revenues.4
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses background for our empirical setting,
including the lottery system and leasing rules. Section 1.3 describes our data. Section 1.4 explains
our empirical specification and main results. Section 1.5 develops our model and Section 2.9
discusses and concludes.
1.2 Background: Oil Lottery and Reallocation
This paper focuses on oil and gas leasing, drilling, and production activity on United States Fed-
eral Government owned land. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), a division of the Depart-
ment of the Interior, allocates leases to drill for and produce oil and gas. We focus our study on
Wyoming, where approximately 52% of the land is owned by the federal government, and where
there has been significant oil and gas production (Fairfax and Yale, 1987).
Our analysis uses leases that were allocated by the BLM via lottery, providing randomiza-
tion that is key to our identification strategy. The BLM began using a lottery system for “non-
competitive” land in 1960 as a way to provide an orderly and fair allocation (Bureau of Land
Management, 1983).5 “Non-competitive” land was designated as such if it was on the site of a
lapsed lease, the previous lease was not known to be productive, and the land was at least one mile
away from known oil or gas production (Fairfax and Yale, 1987).6 The lottery system ended in
3One example with a similar reallocation process is highlighted in a recent Wall Street Journal article highlighting
how 30 of 104 entrants into a wireless spectrum auction were individuals taking advantage of a 25% discount designed
to encourage new entrants. Successful bidders who qualify for discounts are allowed to lease all their airwaves to larger
companies and sell the airwaves after 5 years.
4Many state-run lotteries (like “Powerball”) generate more revenue than the value of the prize. Additionally,
auctions can generate substantially less revenue than the expected value of the prize if competition is limited.
5“Before 1960, these tracts were offered on a first-come, first-served basis. When particularly promising tracts
were due to be posted as available, long lines formed at the land offices. Fights often broke out, disrupting business
and, in some instances, injuring employees trying to control the crowds. The simultaneous oil and gas lease drawing
was developed to establish an orderly and fair system of awarding these noncompetitive leases.” (Bureau of Land
Management, 1983).
6For land closer to known production, the government used an auction. For land that had never been leased, it used
a first-come first-serve system.
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1987 when the BLM switched to using auctions for this type of land.7,8
Lottery specifics remained constant during our sample period (1975 through 1978), though
they changed slightly during later lotteries. Each month, regional BLM offices would compile a
list of the parcels that would be offered in the lottery.9 Interested individuals and firms typically
had about a week to submit an entry card to the regional BLM office for each lottery they wanted
to enter (Bureau of Land Management, 1983). Many entrants filed multiple cards, one per plot for
multiple plots, with a $10 filing fee for each entry card submitted. As this entry fee was very low,
it was unlikely to restrict individuals who had less industry experience and capital from entering.
The regional BLM office would then draw three entry cards – one for the first-place winner,
along with two runner-ups – which we refer to as the first-, second-, and third-place winners. The
holder of the first place winning entry card had 30 days to submit a rental payment, equal to $1 per
acre, in order to secure the lease. If the first-place winner did not respond with a rental payment
within 30 days, the BLM contacted the second-place winner with a notification that the first-place
winner had not responded and that the second-place winner was now eligible to submit the rental
payment and obtain the lease. In the case of no response, the BLM then turned to the third-place
winner.10 Lottery losers were informed of their loss by the return of their entrance cards (Bureau
of Land Management, 1983).
In order to retain leases after winning, new lessees were required to continue to comply with
BLM leasing rules. Lessees paid a rental fee of $1 per acre per year in the years prior to any oil
or gas production. After leases began production they paid a royalty, typically 12.5 percent, on
revenues from production. If a lease had oil or gas production within 10 years of the lease start
date, the lease continued until production ended. If there was no production within 10 years and if
qualifying drilling operations were not in progress, leases generally expired and were returned to
the BLM. A lease also ended if the lessee formally abandoned it or failed to pay rental fees (Fairfax
and Yale, 1987). These expired and abandoned leases were then re-offered through lottery–or via
auction, if they expired after 1987.
Two institutional features helped leases to be reallocated to the optimal owners. First, there
7One of the main reasons for this change was to combat middlemen from “filing services” who charged excessive
fees to file entry cards on behalf of unsophisticated parties. For example, a $250 filing fee might be charged to a retiree
in Florida (with the middleman keeping $240 and sending the $10 fee in to the BLM).
8The BLM still uses lotteries for parcels that receive no bids in the auction.
9The Cheyenne office’s region included Wyoming, as well as small parts of Nebraska, Kansas, etc. We exclude
leases outside of Wyoming due to data limitations.
10By matching winner records with transactions records, we estimate that approximately 98% of leases were claimed
by the first-place winner.
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were low search costs: the BLM maintains an open records office where anyone can easily look
up the name and contact information of current lessees. Low search costs increase the number of
potential buyers who might contact a lessee. More potential buyers may increase buyer willingness
to sell both by raising the price via competition, as well as by giving the individual additional
signals about the expected value of the lease.
Additionally, misallocation is easily observed. When firms visit the BLM open records office, it
is easy for them to determine whether a current lessee is an oil and gas firm or an individual. Firms
were very aware that many individuals entered the lotteries hoping to strike it rich, which they could
likely only do if they transferred their lease to a firm. In these cases, the individuals’ valuations of
leases in the absence of transfer was likely very low, and possibly negative, as the lease required
paying annual rental fees. In contrast, firms typically had positive valuations.
1.3 Data Description & Summary Statistics
1.3.1 Data Description
Our lottery sample is compiled from Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lease data. Lotteries
were held monthly from January 1975 to December 1978, with roughly 225 parcels for lease per
month. We drop a small number of parcels (<1%) due to illegibility in the raw data or for having
fewer than three winners. This leaves a total sample of 10,762 parcels offered over 48 months.
The data include information on the boundaries of the leases, allowing us to match the leases to
drilling and production activity. The data also include the total number of entry cards submitted
for each parcel to be leased, as well as the names of the first-, second-, and third-place winners.
Appendix A.1 discusses this data in greater detail.
The winners’ names allow us to determine whether the winner was a firm or an individual. We
first search the names for terms like “Inc.”, “Production”, or “Corporation.” We then reviewed each
lease’s winners by hand to ensure that they were accurately categorized. Most firms appear to be
oil and gas production companies. Some individuals only appear once or twice and appear to not
have connections to the oil industry. Other individuals appear to be more “sophisticated”, winning
frequently and having close connections with the oil industry.11
Our primary outcomes of interest, drilling and production activity, use data from the Wyoming
Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. These data have been lightly edited to improve quality
by the United States Geological Survey (Biewick, 2011). It includes both the date and Public
11We discuss individuals entering on behalf of firms and other potential manipulations in Appendix A.1.
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Land Survey System location for each well drilled within Wyoming. This allows us to determine
whether a lease had nearby production when it was listed in the lottery, as well as whether drilling
or production occurred on the lease itself.12
We define nearby production to be an oil-producing well drilled within five years of a lease’s
start and located within 2.6 miles of the lease.13 In Appendix A.4 we consider a variety of alterna-
tive definitions of nearby production and find that our results are broadly consistent.
We also compile lease transfer outcome data from the BLM’s LR2000, an administrative
database of federal leases. The LR2000 includes detailed information, including leases trans-
fers, lease terminations, and lease partners. This dataset allows us to measure how quickly markets
correct for misallocation. One limitation of the LR2000 is that a selection of leases is not included
because they expired prior to the digitization of their data. However, we find that approximately
95% of leases from our lottery data can be linked to the LR2000. Unfortunately, increasing this
match rate to 100% is not possible as paper records of leases and lease transfers are destroyed
fifteen years after lease expiration.14
Table 1.1 shows summary statistics for the parcels that were won through the lottery. Columns
(1) and (2) summarize our full sample.15 A typical parcel had about 600 entries submitted and an
area just over one square mile (640 acres), although the variance was large. Wyoming well spacing
rules imply a maximum of about sixteen oil wells (or four natural gas wells) on the average parcel.16
12Production data are only available starting in 1978. The fact that our first leases begin in 1975 but our first
production does not appear until 1978 could be problematic. If, for example, a well was drilled in 1975 and production
finished before 1978 we would be unable to capture this production. However, this is very unlikely for two reasons.
First, immediate drilling was rare because permits needed to be secured and infrastructure (such as roads) frequently
needed to be built before drilling could occur. Second, even if drilling happened within 3 years of the start date, most
wells have long production lifespans, such that we would still observe the well producing by 1978. For example, we
find that of all wells drilled in Wyoming between 1979 and 1985, less than 10% of wells have a lifespan less than 3
years.
13We exclude gas-producing wells because most participants in the colloquially known “oil lease lottery” were
looking for oil, as it was much more profitable. In 1984, oil accounted for about 95% of the energy produced from
hydrocarbons in Wyoming (Fairfax and Yale, 1987). Additionally, the Supreme Court (Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Wisconsin (347 U.S. 672)) ruled that wellhead natural gas prices were subject to regulation by the Federal Power
Commission. Due to price ceilings on wellhead prices and the need to build expensive pipeline infrastructure to
transport natural gas, wells producing natural gas were much less profitable and less likely to be an important source
of information asymmetry.
14E-mail exchange with Wyoming BLM public room, Feb 13, 2015.
15Columns (3) and (4) summarize a restricted sample that has better identification. The restricted sample, where
exactly one of the three winners was a firm, will be discussed in greater detail in Section 1.4.1).
16To reduce common pool problems, Wyoming restricts where wells can be located. Within each square mile
section, land is divided into four square quarter-mile sections and further subdivided into sixteen sixteenth-of-a-square-
mile squares known as quarter-quarters. Wyoming allows there to be one natural gas well per quarter, and the wells
must be located at the center of the quarter. For oil wells, there can be only one well per quarter-quarter, and each well
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We find that firms made up a relatively small fraction of winners. Only 6% of parcels had a firm
as the first place winner. Similarly, 6% of all winners (first-, second-, or third-place) were firms.
These leases typically had low expected productivity, only 3% resulted in oil production within
twelve years; only 5% had production within thirty years.17
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics at the Parcel Level
Full Sample One FirmWinner
mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
Number of entries 598.09 824.27 427.32 644.99
Area (sq. miles) 1.11 1.09 0.97 1.05
Number of firms among winners 0.19 0.42 1.00 0.00
Firm is first place winner 0.06 0.25 0.34 0.48
Nearby production indicator 0.22 0.42 0.21 0.41
Any drilling within 5 years 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18
Any drilling within 12 years 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26
Any drilling within 30 years 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.33
Any production within 5 years 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.11
Any production within 12 years 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17
Any production within 30 years 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.21
Notes: The first two columns describe the entire sample (10,762 parcels). The second two columns
describe the restricted sample where exactly one of the three winners was a corporation (1,800
parcels). The number of parcels is a round number (1,800) by chance, no sampling has occurred.
1.3.2 Ruling out Corruption & Testing for Randomness
Our identification strategy could be threatened if the lottery was not truly random – either because
of corruption or other factors. If, for example, firms bribed BLM officials to win desirable parcels,
that would invalidate our assumption that the underlying parcels were ex-ante identical. We now
check whether there is evidence of lottery manipulation.18
We do not find that firms placed first a disproportionate amount of the time. Of the 2047
must similarly be located at the center of the quarter-quarter.
17Thirty years after the beginning of our leases, the original leases have generally lapsed and the lands are owned
by winners of subsequent allocation procedures.
18We investigate this in part because of allegations of computer fraud surrounding the 1983 lottery of leases in the
Amos Draw geological formation. A Department of the Interior study determined that earlier incidents of multiple
winners were caused by entrants entering many parcels and that the frequency of multiple winners was within statistical
expectations (referenced in a Chicago Tribune article). Nevertheless, we conduct this analysis to convince ourselves
that the lottery was fair.
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appearances by firms, 697 (34.0%) of these are in first place, 658 (32.1%) are in second, and 692
(33.8%) in third. While 34.0% of firms appearing in first place is slightly above the 33.3% that
we would expect, the binomial distribution predicts that there is a 24% chance of observing 697
or more firms in first place, given 2047 total appearances. Within the restricted sample of 1,800
parcels we have a similar distribution of firms across winners (619 in first place), with a 16%
chance that at least 619 firms appear in first place.
Table 1.2 tests whether parcels won by firms are similar on observables to those won by indi-
viduals. We restrict the sample to parcels where exactly one firm was amongst the three winners
and compare parcel characteristics. Within this restricted sample, we find that parcels won by in-
dividuals and firms are very similar; those won by individuals have slightly more offers and are
slightly larger, but the differences are well within the type of statistical variation we would expect
to see. We therefore proceed under the assumption that the lottery was fair.




Offers Mean 430.99 420.33 0.74
Offers Variance 647.17 641.28 0.80
Acreage Mean 628.33 610.32 0.59
Acreage Variance 676.40 663.68 0.59
Nearby Production Mean 0.20 0.23 0.19
Nearby Production Variance 0.40 0.42 0.19
Notes: We restrict the sample to the 1,800 parcels where exactly one firm appeared amongst the
three winners. Statistics for parcels won by individuals are reported in column (1), while column
(2) reports those won by firms. Column (3) reports the p-value from an equality test.
1.4 Analysis
We first detail our empirical strategies and how we correct for endogenous entry. We then look
at lease transactions data to see how quickly secondary markets transferred leases. Next, we ex-
amine whether there is evidence that the initial winner’s identity affects drilling and production.




A simple comparison of leases won by firms with leases won by individuals will not correct for
lottery participants endogenously choosing which lotteries to enter. Table 1.3 shows that the total
number of entries for a given lease is negatively correlated with the probability that the winner is
a firm. It also shows that the number of entries is positively correlated with both ex-ante (total
acreage) and ex-post (probability of drilling) measures of profitability. That is, individuals tend to
crowd out firms on parcels with higher expected productivity. As a result, firms are less likely to
win leases that eventually had drilling or production.
Table 1.3: Variable Correlations: Full Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1: Number of entries 1.00
2: Area 0.41 1.00
3: Nearby production 0.14 -0.14 1.00
4: Drilling within 12 years 0.20 0.08 0.18 1.00
5: Production within 12 years 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.63 1.00
6: Number of winning firms -0.10 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 1.00
7: Firm is first place winner -0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.58 1.00
Notes: Correlations between selected variables for each observation using the unrestricted sample
with all 10,762 parcels.
To illustrate the effects of a näıve comparison, suppose we ran the following regression where
the probability of drilling at time t (Yi) is regressed on a constant and an indicator for whether the
winner was a firm (Fi):
Yi = α0 + β1Fi + εi (1.1)
In this specification, β1 estimates the näıve treatment effect of a firm winning a lease: it will be
biased because εi is correlated with Fi. Our specification would not control for the fact that plots
won by firms are disproportionately low quality.
Our primary specification breaks the correlation between εi and Fi by restricting our sample
to the set of leases where exactly one firm was among the first-, second-, and third-place winners.
Within this subsample, a firm is no more likely to be in first place than they are to be in second-
or third-place. Therefore, the treatment effect of a firm winning a lease will be uncorrelated with
unobservables and we obtain an unbiased estimate. All differences in outcomes are therefore
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attributable to differential behavior by different classes of winners.19
The parcels in this subsample are similar to the total sample, though of slightly lower quality.
Parcels in the subsample tend to have fewer entrants on average (425 versus 598 in the full sample),
slightly smaller acreage (0.97 square miles versus 1.11 in the full sample), and lower likelihoods
of eventual drilling and production. This is consistent with the fact that individuals crowd out firms
on leases with higher expected profitability. Table 1.4 shows correlations between variables within
the subsample – it is similar to Table 1.3, which looks at the entire sample. However, the type of
winner that is in first place is no longer correlated with the number of offers or the parcel size.
Table 1.4: Variable Correlations: Restricted Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1: Number of entries 1.00
2: Area 0.40 1.00
3: Nearby production 0.09 -0.15 1.00
4: Drilling within 12 years 0.20 0.09 0.16 1.00
5: Production within 12 years 0.17 0.03 0.16 0.63 1.00
6: Number of winning firms . . . . . .
7: Firm is first place winner -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.00 -0.02 . 1.00
Notes: Correlations between selected variables for each observation using the restricted sample
with exactly one firm winner (1,800 parcels).
Our primary specification using this subsample is:
Yi = α0 + β1Fi + β2NearbyProdi + β3NearbyProdi ∗ Fi + ΩXi + εi (1.2)
Our primary specification includes an indicator for nearby production, as well as an interaction
term between the identity of the lessee and the presence of nearby production. We also include
control variables (a spline in the number of offers, total acreage, and month-of-lottery fixed effects)
that are not necessary but may improve precision.20,21
In this specification, β1 informs us about the effect of assigning a lease to an individual or a
firm. This coefficient will help us to answer our first research question – in the absence of large
19We would like to examine leases where exactly two of the three winners are firms. However, the very small sample
size of this exercise prevents us from making meaningful inference.
20We use a linear probability model, which is appropriate for calculating average treatment effects (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008). The AIC and BIC suggest a linear probability model is a better fit for our data than a logit or probit.
21Results without the control variables are similar.
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frictions, can we find evidence that initial asset allocations do not matter? A large and positive β1
will tell us that leases won by individuals are not being reassigned to optimal owners - and that
leases won by firms have more drilling and production.
β2 informs us about the overall effect of having nearby production on a lease. Note that this
will capture several effects. Because nearby oil and gas increases the chances of oil and gas on
one’s own land, we expect that drilling and production will be more common when there is nearby
production. However, this effect may be diminished to the extent that information asymmetry from
nearby production inhibits optimal asset reallocation for both firms and individuals.
β3 captures the differential effect of nearby production on firms versus individuals. Because
firms are in a better initial position to exploit leases that they win, we might expect this coefficient
to be positive. To the extent that this interaction effect is negative, it must be because individuals
are better able to reassign their parcels to firms with the highest value.
We analyze several outcome variables (Yi) of interest; we look at lease reassignment by time t,
drilling by time t, production by time t, probability of production given drilling by time t, days to
well completion, and total production from producing wells.
Throughout our analysis, we use (Conley, 1999) spatial standard errors. We allow εi and εj to
be correlated if section i and section j are within twenty miles of each other.22
Secondary Specification
We also consider a specification using our entire sample, which increases the precision of our
estimates, but relies on the assumption that control variables eliminate bias from endogenous entry.
We rely on the number of offers for a lease, the total acreage of a lease, and a set of month-
of-lottery fixed effects to control for unobservables that are correlated with the probability a firm
wins a lease. The number of offers is highly correlated with ex-post measures of profitability like
drilling and production. This is because entrants know that not all parcels are equal – they know
the exact location of each parcel, which gives them important information about how far away the
nearest road is, limited geological information, and the ability to find out limited information about
the productivity of nearby plots. The least desirable parcels received less than ten entries, while
the most desirable received several thousand. This kind of variance is not random and is possible
because people have different expectations about the profitability of different plots.23
22Lewis (2015) shows that information about parcels in section j, more than 20 miles away from section i, do not
provide information about how productive section i will be.
23Indeed, under certain conditions the ex-ante expected value of a parcel can be exactly determined by the number
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Our secondary specification is run on the full sample of leases:
Yi = α0 + β1Fi + β2NearbyProdi + β3NearbyProdi ∗ Fi
+ β4TotalAcreagei + s(NumOffers) + δMi + εi (1.3)
We use a cubic spline, s(), with six knot points to allow for flexibility in the relationship be-
tween outcome variables and the number of offers. Mi are month-of-lottery fixed effects. Our
coefficients of interest remain β1 and β3; their interpretation is the same as in our primary spec-
ification. Results using our second specification are very similar to results using our primary
specification.
1.4.2 Lease Transactions: Results
We first examine lease transactions in order to understand how firms and individuals treated their
drilling rights. This will help to inform expectations about whether they are looking to drill on the
parcels they have won, or perhaps are looking to flip the parcels for a quick profit.24 Figure 1.1
uses our restricted sample with exactly one firm winner and displays how long it took for leases to
be transferred for the first time.25,26
We find that lease transfers were an important part of lease development. Nearly 30% of leases
won by individuals were transferred within the first year of a lease. In contrast, firms were 22%
less likely to transfer leases during the first year. Instead, firms were the most likely to hold on
of entries. Suppose, for example, that the value of winning a plot is $1,000. The cost of entering the lottery is $10.
Therefore, the expected value of entering a lottery is 1/N * $1,000 - $10. One would want to enter the lottery for a
plot if they expected N to be less than 100 and would not want to enter if they expected more than 100 entries. If there
were 200 potential entrants, one potential Nash equilibrium of an entry game involves all participants flipping a coin
to determine if they enter. The expected number of entrants will be 100 and no party will find it profitable to deviate
from the coin-flip entry strategy.
24One concern with the LR2000 is that the digitization of lease records began in the late 1980’s; however, we are
able to match over 95% of the leases because paper records were transcribed during that time. Importantly, we do
not find a substantial difference in match rates between individuals and corporations. We believe that leases that do
not appear in the LR2000 are most likely to have been passed over by the winner or to have expired early, though we
cannot conclusively rule out other possibilities.
25Note that not all “first transfers” were to corporations. Indeed, our examination of the administrative database
indicates many winning individuals first transferred portions of their leases to family members or other individuals.
Many of these leases were re-transferred at later points in time, frequently to firms. We focus on “first transfers”
because the administrative database only identifies parties by shorthand. Interpreting the type of party (firm vs. indi-
vidual) is straightforward on a case-by-case basis. However, doing so systematically would be a major undertaking
and almost certainly would not change our conclusions.
26Appendix A.2 presents regression results presents regressions using Equation 1.2 and our restricted sample to
analyze years until initial lease reassignment.
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Figure 1.1: Years until First Lease Reassignment
Notes: Histogram of the amount of time, in years, until a lease is transferred. Graph limited to
leases where exactly one firm appeared among the first-, second-, and third-place winners. Indi-
viduals are in black outlines and firms are in green. Leases that do not have a recorded transfer are
in the “Never” category, while leases that could not be linked to the LR2000 data are in the “No
Match” category.
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to the lease without ever transferring it —firms did this 22% more frequently than individuals.
Therefore, the secondary market was an important mechanism to correct for misallocation and
individuals were more likely to take advantage of the secondary market. Not only were a large
fraction of leases initially allocated to individuals eventually transferred, but there was also a sig-
nificant number of transfers from firms.
1.4.3 Firms vs. Individuals: Drilling Results
We first examine the total effect of having a firm in first place, regardless of whether a parcel has
nearby production or not. We identify whether a lease has drilling within 1, 2, ..., and 15 years
after the start of the lease, and whether it had production within 3, 4, ..., and 15 years of the start
of the lease.27 Leases without drilling activity generally ended after ten years, though some were
extended because qualifying drilling operations were in progress. Due to the frequency of lease
extensions, our preferred measure of ‘final’ differences due to initial allocation is at twelve years
after the lease has begun. We also provide a limited expansion of this time frame to demonstrate
that our results do not change substantially after lease expiration.
Figure 1.2 contains results of regressions analyzing the rollout of drilling activity using Equa-
tion 1.1. The dependent variable in panel (a) is an indicator for whether any drilling occurred on a
lease up to X years following the lottery.28 This regression is run for each of the first fifteen years
following a lottery and the estimates are connected by a line. Panels (b) and (c) use an indicator
variable for whether any production has occurred, with panel (c) restricting the sample only to
parcels where drilling has occurred. This figure presents the total effect, including parcels with
and without information asymmetry, of having a firm in first place using our restricted sample. We
also include the p value of the test of equality.
We find that few parcels are drilled immediately after the lease starts, but that by the twelfth
year, about 7.5% of parcels experience drilling. We find that firms are slightly less likely to drill and
produce, though the results are not statistically significant. Panel (c) suggests that firms may have
slightly lower probabilities of production given drilling, though the differences are not generally
significant and full sample results do not support this conclusion.
We also examine drilling and production outcomes over time using our full sample of 10,762
parcels. Figure 1.3 reports results without controlling for endogenous entry in the left column,
while the right hand column includes variables like the number of offers for a lease to control for
27We exclude production for the first few years because our lottery data begin in 1975 but our production data does
not begin until 1978.
28For example, a lease in year six has had drilling if that drilling happened in any lease year from one through six.
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Figure 1.2: Restricted Sample Results: All Leases
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Restricted sample limited to cases where exactly one firm appeared among the first-,
second-, and third-place winners. The firm effect is the coefficient on an indicator for whether
the first place winner was a firm. This specification does not include an interaction between an
indicator for nearby production and an indicator for whether the first place winner was a firm. The
right vertical axis gives the p value of a test that the two means are not equal. Panel (c) excludes
month-of-lottery fixed effects due to the small sample size of this specification.
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land quality (detailed in Equation 1.3). The left column suggests that leases won by firms are less
likely to have drilling or production. However, when we control for land quality on the right, most
of the differences disappear. Indeed, results with controls look very similar to those in Figure 1.2.
Point estimates suggest that firms may have lower likelihoods of drilling and production, though
the results are not statistically significant. Overall, we find that initial assignment does not affect
drilling and production outcomes.29
1.4.4 Nearby Production
We now investigate whether firms or individuals perform differentially better in the presence of
nearby production. Table 1.5 presents the coefficients from regressions using Equation 1.2 results
after the twelfth year of a lease (Table A.3 presents the full sample analog in Appendix A.3). The
first row of Table 1.5 indicates that the presence of nearby production is associated with much
higher rates of drilling and production (columns (3) and (4)). This is to be expected, as nearby oil
is one of the best predictors of oil underfoot. Row 2 shows that leases won by firms and individuals,
absent nearby production, have similar outcomes. It is similar to results in the previous section;
we will briefly expand on this in the following section.
The third row, an interaction between nearby production and whether the initial winner was a
firm, shows that leases won by firms have differentially lower rates of drilling and production than
those won by individuals when nearby production is present. Figures 1.4 uses our restricted sample
and presents results for each year following the lease lottery.30 The dashed line shows the p-value
from a test with the hypothesis that firms and individuals have the same results (for example, year
twelve tests whether the sum of rows two and three from Table 1.5 is equivalent to zero).
Appendix A.4 presents a range of alternative specifications to check the robustness of our
results. In particular, we consider specifications that vary the distance that we define as “nearby”,
the number of years that we define as “recent”, and whether we include productive gas wells.
Finally, we also present results including dry wells to demonstrate that nearby production is the
important dimension, not nearby activity.
1.4.5 No Nearby Production
We now present results for parcels without nearby production; these results are similar to the total
effect results presented in Section 1.4.3. Figure 1.5 uses our restricted sample and presents the
29Appendix A.5 looks at drilling time and production quantities. However, due to a lack of precision, we do not find
these results to be substantive. They are included for completeness.
30Figure A.2 presents the full-sample analog in Appendix A.3
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Figure 1.3: Full Sample Results: All Leases
(a) Drilling, No Controls (b) Drilling, With Controls
(c) Production, No Controls (d) Production, With Controls
(e) Production Given Drilling,
No Controls
(f) Production Given Drilling,
With Controls
Notes: The left column presents the full sample with no controls. The right column controls for
underlying land quality. The firm effect is the coefficient on an indicator for whether the first place
winner was a firm. These specifications do not include an interaction between an indicator for
nearby production and an indicator for whether the first place winner was a firm. The right vertical
axis gives the p value of a test that the two means are not equal.
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Figure 1.4: Restricted Sample Results: Leases with Nearby Production
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Restricted sample with one firm winner. Estimates are reported for parcels with nearby
production. The firm effect is the sum of the coefficient on an indicator for whether the first place
winner was a firm, plus the coefficient on an interaction between the firm winner indicator and
an indicator for nearby production. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test that the two
means are not equal. Panel (c) excludes month-of-lottery fixed effects due to the small sample size
of this specification.
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Table 1.5: Regression Results: Lease Transfers




to Reassign Drill Prod P | D
Nearby Production
Flag 0.027 0.019 0.136∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.130
(0.038) (0.146) (0.026) (0.020) (0.149)
Firm Winner -0.219∗∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗ 0.014 -0.000 -0.047
(0.027) (0.113) (0.013) (0.007) (0.130)
Firm/Nearby Prod
Interaction -0.057 0.089 -0.106∗∗∗ -0.043∗ -0.269
(0.067) (0.233) (0.031) (0.024) (0.222)
Offers &
Acreage Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lottery Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.156 0.159 0.114 0.086 0.385
Observations 1800 1196 1800 1800 128
Notes: This table uses the probability of reassignment by twelve years (1), length of time given
reassignment (2), probability of drilling by twelve years (3), probability of production by twelve
years (4), and probability of production given drilling by twelve years (5) as dependent variables.
Nearby production is a binary indicator for any production within 2.6 miles of the section(s) the
lease is located on. This table uses our restricted sample. Column (2) does not correct for selection
into reassignment. Point estimates using a Heckman two-step are similar.
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difference between firms and individuals on land without nearby production.31,32 Results using
both our primary specification on the restricted sample and our secondary specification on the full
sample show that firms and individuals have similar outcomes when parcels do not have nearby
production. Panel (c) shows that production given drilling is similar; the point estimates suggest
that firms have slightly lower rates, though they are not significant. Table 1.5, Row 2, presents the
coefficients for these results twelve years after the leases were lotteried.33
1.5 Reassignment and Drilling Model
The preceding sections present two key results. We find that information symmetry leads leases
won by firms and individuals to have very similar outcomes, a result that is consistent with well-
functioning secondary markets and provides evidence that the Coase Theorem has real-world ap-
plications. However, information asymmetry from nearby production imposes an important barrier
to trade that causes leases won by firms to have less drilling and production. Because individuals
are generally not drilling wells themselves, these drilling and production differences must arise
due to different lease reassignment strategies.
We now develop a model to provide insight into our primary findings, with an emphasis on how
leases won by firms can have lower rates of drilling than those won by individuals. Our model of
asymmetric information is informed by Akerlof (1970); Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and
Samuelson (1984). It is most analogous to results derived in Myerson (1985) and Samuelson
(1985). One departure from the previous literature is that their models assume the seller is the
party with private information. In our setting, the buyer will have superior information due to their
nearby production.
1.5.1 Model Preliminaries
Our stylized model has three types of agents: firms that initially win a lease (F), individuals that
initially win a lease (I), and the lowest cost firm that is interested in purchasing a lease (LCF).
All parties are risk neutral. The lease has an underlying true value of production, θ ∼ U[0,1]. In
the base version of our model there is no information asymmetry and all agents can only form
expectations about the true value of θ. In the absence of private information, E[θ] is the same for
all parties.
31Figure A.3 presents the full-sample analog in Appendix A.3.
32Because less than 25% of our total sample has nearby production, our results are similar to those in Figure 1.2,
which does not adjust for nearby production.
33Table A.3 presents the full sample analog in Appendix A.3.
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Figure 1.5: Restricted Sample Results: Leases without Nearby Production
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Restricted sample with one firm winner. Estimates are reported for parcels without nearby
production. The firm effect is the coefficient on an indicator for whether the first place winner was
a firm. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test that the two means are not equal. Panel (c)
excludes month-of-lottery fixed effects due to the small sample size of this specification.
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Each type of lessee has a specific cost of drilling, Cj, j ∈ {I, F}, that is public knowledge
and known with certainty. The LCF’s cost of drilling, CLCF , is also public knowledge and known
with certainty. We assume that CI > CF ≥ CLCF . Note that the cost difference between firms
and individuals is the only assumed difference between firms and individuals. It is reasonable for
individuals to have the highest costs, as they generally do not have the capital and expertise to drill
oil wells. Firms that are initial lessees and LCFs are likely to have similar costs when there is no
nearby production.
The game proceeds in two stages. First, the lessee and LCF bargain over the lease. Bargaining
happens via a take-it-or-leave-it offer, Oj , made by the LCF.34 Following the reassignment stage,
the lease owner decides whether or not drill. Expected payoffs from drilling equal the expected
value of θ less the cost of drilling (Cj). Drilling happens if this value is positive.
1.5.2 Model Solution
The model solution without information asymmetry is quite simple. Because all information is
public, parties do not learn anything as the bargaining process plays out. All parties will evaluate
the expected value of drilling at 1/2. If 1/2 > CLCF and Cj > CLCF then there are gains from
trade. The LCF will look to buy the lease and drill on it. They will offer the minimum price such
that the lessee will accept, the lease will be traded, and drilling will occur. If a lease is initially
won by a firm, 1/2 > CF and CF = CLCF , no trade will occur, but the initial lessee will make the
same drilling decision that the LCF would.
Our setup yields predictions that are realized in the data. The eventual outcomes in terms of
drilling and production will be similar, regardless of who wins the lease. Additionally, firms will
be less likely to trade their lease than individuals. This is because the winning firm may be the
lowest cost firm. We might also expect small transaction costs (not explicitly modeled) to inhibit
trade between firms with similar drilling costs. We now turn to a richer model that explains our
results on information asymmetry.
1.5.3 Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry requires two adjustments to our assumptions. First, the LCF is replaced
by a nearby production firm (NPF). The NPF is the potential buyer; their existing production
34In our basic framework, results are not sensitive to the type of bargaining framework. When we introduce in-
formation asymmetry, results will become sensitive to the choice of bargaining framework. This model demonstrates
how information asymmetry can lead to worse outcomes for leases won by firms. We do not find that information
asymmetry always leads to worse outcomes for leases won by firms.
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allows them to know the true θ of the lease in question. Lease winners still do not have private
information and can only form expectations about the value of θ. However, lessees are able to
update these expectations based on offers they receive from the NPF. Notice that this will lead to a
pooling equilibrium; a separating equilibrium is impossible because the NPF has no credible way
to signal the true θ of the lease. Second, let costs be CI > CF > CNPF . It is reasonable for the
NPF to have the lowest costs, as they are already producing in the area.35
We now solve for the equilibrium of our simple bargaining model. The primary complication
is that the lessee will update their expectations about the parcel’s value as soon as an offer is made
by the nearby producing firm.
If the initial lessee retains the lease after receiving an offer, Oj , it will receive their updated
expectation of θ less their costs of drilling: E[θ|Oj] − Cj . Thus, it will only trade if the offer is
welfare improving: Oj > E[θ|Oj]− Cj . Notice that there is no profitable deviation – if the initial
lessee rejects an offer when Oj > E[θ|Oj] − Cj (or accepts an offer when Oj < E[θ|Oj] − Cj),
it will be worse off. E[θ|Oj] is determined by realizing that an offer of Oj indicates that the true
value of θ lies somewhere between Oj + CNPF (adding CNPF to account for the cost of drilling a
well) and 1.36 The uniform distribution means that E[θ|Oj] = (Oj+CNPF+1)2 .
Thus, the initial lessee will accept a trade if Oj >
(Oj+CNPF+1)
2
− Cj , which reduces to:37
Oj > 1 + CNPF − 2Cj (1.4)
The NPF will be willing to offer a trade if the true value of θ is greater than its cost of acquisition
plus the cost of drilling:
θ −Oj − CNPF > 0 (1.5)
The NPF will find the minimum Oj such that the Equation 1.4 is satisfied and then offer this
minimum Oj if it satisfies Equation 1.5. Substituting the first inequality into the second, we find
that trade will happen when:38
θ > 1 + 2CNPF − 2Cj (1.6)
35Due to the randomized nature of the lottery and the fact that most leases with nearby production had a mean
(median) of more than 750 (325) offers, firms that win leases are unlikely to be the nearby producing firm.
36If an offer is made, this interval will always be of the form [X,1], where X is between 0 and 1. Neither Oj nor
CNPF can be less than 0; a lessee would never accept a negative offer and drilling costs are assumed to be positive.
Additionally, the NPF will not make an offer such that Oj + CNPF is greater than 1, as this will result in a negative
payoff for all possible values of θ.
37Oj >
(Oj+CNPF+1)
2 − Cj ⇒ 2Oj > Oj + CNPF + 1− 2Cj ⇒ Oj > 1 + CNPF − 2Cj .
38θ − (1 + CNPF − 2Cj)− CNPF > 0⇒ θ − 1− 2CNPF + 2Cj > 0⇒ θ > 1 + 2CNPF − 2Cj .
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For all θs that satisfy Equation 1.6, the NPF will make the same bid, the minimum Oj that satisfies
Equation 1.4.39 Drilling will necessarily occur.40 Notice that the individual’s higher cost of drilling
leads to a greater range of θs that are traded.
When trade does not occur, the lessee decides whether or not to drill based on whether E[θ|no
offer] − Cj > 0. In this situation, the lessee knows that θ lies between 0 and 1 + 2CNPF − 2Cj .
Thus, E[θ|no offer] − Cj = 0+1+2CNPF−2Cj2 − Cj =
1
2
+ CNPF − 2Cj . Notice that the expected




costs are high (Cj > 14 +
CNPF
2
), the lessee will choose not to drill. Note that the firm will be in a
better position to drill a retrained lease. However, individuals are more likely to trade leases, and
traded leases are always drilled.
In equilibrium, drilling will happen whenever there is trade (when θ ∈ [1 + 2CNPF − 2Cj, 1].
If θ < 1+2CNPF −2Cj , trade will not happen and drilling will only occur if 12 +CNPF −2Cj > 0.
1.5.4 Empirical Predictions
We are now able to examine our empirical findings. Is it possible for leases won by individuals to
have more drilling than those won by firms? The answer depends on the costs of drilling.
Suppose that we are in an environment where the firm has low drilling costs and the individual
lessee has high drilling costs (CI > 14 +
CNPF
2
> CF ). For example, CNPF = 0, CF = 0.1, and CI
= 0.5. If our data are actually represented by θ ∼ U[0,1], our model predicts that trade and drilling
will occur 90% of the time if individuals win all of the leases. In contrast, our model predicts trade
will occur 20% of the time and drilling will occur 100% of the time when firms win. The higher
level of drilling for parcels won by firms results from a high expected θ when there is no trade,
combined with a low CF .






). For example, CNPF = 0.5, CF = 0.6, and CI = 1.0. If individuals win all
the leases, trade and drilling will occur 50% of the time. If firms win all of the leases, trade will
occur 20% of the time and drilling will also occur 20% of the time. In this situation, assigning the
leases to individuals will result in a higher proportion of them being drilled – consistent with our
39Again, note that there are no profitable deviations from this strategy. If the NPF offers more than the minimum
Oj , it will not increase the range of θs that are accepted. If the NPF offers less than the minimum Oj , its offer will be
rejected.
40We have not discussed what happens when θ is below the threshold. It is possible that the NPF could make an
offer, knowing that it will not be accepted. This possibility can be rejected by either assigning a small transaction
cost to making an offer, or by arguing that the NPF may not wish to provide information (in the form of an offer) to a
competing nearby firm if it will not benefit from doing so.
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empirical findings.
1.5.5 Testing Trade with Nearby Producing Firms
We now turn to examining the primary finding of our model: due to their lower drilling costs,
firms will be less willing than individuals to trade their leases to nearby producing firms.41 We
scraped the identities of nearby producing well operators and matched these nearby operators to
firms in the LR2000 lease history. We then estimate how frequently leases won by firms (relative
to individuals) are traded with nearby producing firms using the following regression:
TradeNPFi = α0 + β1Fi + ΩXi + εi (1.7)
The dependent variable is whether we have matched a lessee as trading with a nearby producing
well operator. The primary coefficient of interest, β1, tells us whether firms are differentially less
likely to trade with a nearby producing well operator. For this analysis, our sample is the set of
leases with nearby production.
Our analysis is primarily limited because we cannot perfectly identify whether trade happened
with the nearby producing firm. This leads to attenuation bias.42 This imperfect match identi-
fication arises from four sources. First, our available well operator data does not also identify
the nearby lessee. Any trades with a nearby lessee different from the operator will not be cor-
rectly matched.43 Second, both the assignment data and the nearby operator data are incomplete.
In particular, nearby operators are unavailable before 1978. Both datasets are likely missing ob-
servations, with greater completeness in later years. Third, neither dataset identifies corporate
relationships. This means we will fail to identify a trade to a subsidiary or former employee of
a nearby operator as a match. Finally, our analysis will be limited by imperfect identification of
the “nearby” wells. For example, a well drilled outside of our five-year drilling window may have
an owner that will be able to make the correct drilling decision, but we will not flag this type of
41Note that our earlier results demonstrate firms are less likely to transfer overall. This may not affect drilling
frequency in the absence of information asymmetry because many firms are similar. However, failing to trade to
nearby producers can have long-term consequences because they are likely to use their proprietary information to
make different drilling decisions than the initial lessees.
42Because the dependent variable is binary, measurement error is non-classical and results in attenuation bias.









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Winner -0.079∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.023 -0.005
(0.029) (0.018) (0.025) (0.019)
intercept 0.049∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.027 0.000
(0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.015)
Full Sample No Yes No Yes
Offers &
Acreage Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lottery Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
R squared 0.069 0.038 0.034 0.018
Observations 376 2399 443 2644
Notes: We examine how frequently leases are reassigned to firms that have nearby production.
Column (1) uses our restricted sample and Column (2) uses the full sample. Columns (3) and (4)
look at how frequently leases are reassigned to distant firms with production in the area. We allow
reassignments to happen at any point during the lease. A pooled regression testing whether the
‘Firm Winner’ coefficient is different in columns (1) and (3) yields a p-value of 0.128. A pooled
regression testing whether the ‘Firm Winner’ coefficient is different in columns (2) and (4) yields
a p-value of 0.003.
Table 1.6 reports our primary results. In columns (1) and (2), we look at the set of leases with
nearby production and examine whether leases are ever reassigned to a nearby producing firm.
We find that firm winners about 7.5% less likely to have their parcels ever reassigned to a nearby
44Our analysis will also be limited because we are matching text strings. Abbreviations and typos introduce mea-
surement error and lower our match rate. For example, “Gulf” can be matched with “Petrogulf Corporation” or “Gulf
Oil”. We use “Gulf” as the basis for matching because abbreviations are ubiquitous in the LR2000. Matching only
with full names will cause many false negatives.
45Finally, we note that our preferred analysis looks at whether parcels are ever reassigned to the current nearby
producing firm. In Appendix A.6 we examine whether parcels are traded to the current nearby operator before drilling
has begun. We prefer our primary analysis because of the opaque nature of firm relationships. If nearby production
is listed by “Conoco”, it is possible that the nearby production was actually by Philips Oil Company, which was then
bought by Conoco. However, we may not observe Philips as a nearby producer. Therefore, a lease traded to Philips,
and subsequently to Conoco, would yield a false negative. The main drawback to this approach is that our analysis
will occasionally identify matches not suggested by our model – where the trades happen after drilling. Fortunately,
both approaches yield similar results as most matches are prior to drilling.
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producing firms. Columns (3) and (4) use a sample without nearby production within 2.6 miles,
but with production between 2.6 and 5.2 miles away from the lease. Here, we find that firms
and individuals have similar rates of reassignment. These results show that when there is nearby
production, firms are differentially less likely to reassign parcels to nearby producing firms.46
Is the magnitude of this effect large enough to explain the full drilling differences we find
between leases won by firms and those won by individuals? By itself, no. However, it does
demonstrate that firms are reassigning their leases differently than individuals. Additionally, we
expect that attenuation bias from measurement error causes the coefficients to be smaller than their
true values. These differing reassignment processes appear to be the primary cause of different
lease outcomes.
1.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Overall, the accumulation of evidence suggests two facts. First, leases without information asym-
metry are efficiently reallocated via a robust secondary market. The secondary market allows for
similar drilling and production outcomes, regardless of initial allocation. Second, information
asymmetry inhibits trade between firms and nearby producing firms. This leads to worse outcomes
for these types of leases when they are initially assigned to firms. In our setting, we can conclude
that it is better to initially have a bad match than it is to have a mediocre match. Because the
mechanism – information asymmetry – is not specific to our setting, our findings are likely more
broadly applicable.
Our finding that information asymmetry affected firms more severely than individuals may
seem surprising at first. However, our theoretical model, combined with analysis of the transaction
histories, reveals that our results are actually intuitive. Because the average firm is already a
mediocre match for any given lease, the gains from trading that parcel are lower than the gains for
an individual. As a result, many firms (in contrast to individuals) are insufficiently incentivized to
trade their leases in the presence of information asymmetry.
One important policy implication is that lotteries can be a relatively efficient mechanism for al-
locating assets under certain conditions. For example, nature’s “lottery” that allocated oil deposits
46Note that it is unclear whether we should expect the magnitude of the coefficients to be different between columns
(1) and (3). On the one hand, firms are less likely to want to reassign to nearby producing firms than distant producing
firms because it is likely that the nearby firms have a differential information advantage. On the other hand, distant
producing firms may not have a cost advantage over the initial lessee. This would suggest that there are limited gains
from trade. The fact that we see evidence of a differential suggests that there are reassignment gains due to cost
differentials.
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to farmers in the Bakken shale formation likely does not seriously impede the efficient outcome.
Indeed, the Bakken’s mineral rights reallocation process is very similar to the process in our setting;
oil firms employ landmen to purchase the rights from individuals without the capital or expertise
to develop the resources. Thus, our results provide evidence in favor of the United States’ policy
of allocating both surface rights and mineral rights to property owners.
Additionally, market designers should carefully evaluate whether information asymmetry is
likely to be present. If it is, taking steps to ensure that assets are not allocated to intermediate-
quality matches can yield tangible benefits. Potential applications include wireless spectrum auc-
tions and electricity transmission markets. In electricity markets, for example, information asym-
metry may arise due to proprietary information about generation costs. Our results suggest that
assigning transmission rights to generating firms is inferior to auctioning the rights or assigning
them randomly via lottery to individuals.
Our work suggests one primary avenue of further research. While lotteries can be an efficient
way of allocating public resources, we do not yet understand how they affect government revenue.
One of the government’s primary goals when allocating a public resource is to raise funds.47 We
will compare lotteries and auctions run by the BLM to determine which allocation method raised
more revenue. There are two possible ways for us to explore this question. We can match auctioned
parcels with similar parcels that were lotteried at the same time. Additionally, we can compare
revenues before and after the BLM switched to an auction for all parcels in 1987. Answering this
question will give us a fuller picture of the relative welfare effects of auctions and lotteries.
47Li (2014) finds that auctions generate greater social welfare than lotteries for Chinese license plate distributions.
However, China does not allow for reallocation of licenses, reducing their efficiency.
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Chapter 2
Natural Gas Prices, Electric Generation
Investment, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions
2.1 Introduction
Natural gas prices have fallen by over 65% from their high in 2008. This decline has been driven
primarily by the large-scale expansion of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) for natural gas, which
has transformed the US natural gas sector. Prior to fracking’s development in the mid-2000’s,
production of natural gas was declining, and projected to decline further. With very large reserves
of shale gas that can be fracked, firms are restricted in the number of productive wells they can
drill only by the capability of their drilling rigs. Consequently, fracking has greatly increased the
amount of natural gas produced in the US and the share of total US natural gas production from
shale gas. From 2007 to 2013, total US natural gas production increased from 24.7 trillion cubic
feet (TCF) to 30.0 TCF and shale gas production more than quintupled from 2 TCF to 11.9 TCF.1
This long-term shift in the natural gas sector is still ongoing.
The reduction in natural gas prices due to the increase in supply from fracking has led to a large
increase in natural gas consumption in the electric sector. Electric utility consumption of natural
gas has increased by 1.3 TCF between 2007 and 2013, or roughly 20 percent.23 Increased natural
gas consumption has come at the expense of dirtier coal, causing a decrease in carbon emissions.
1EIA, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dcu_NUS_a.htm.
22012’s consumption was 2.3 TCF than 2007’s, but consumption fell in 2013 amid slightly higher prices.
3Other uses have seen smaller changes. Residential consumption has increased by about 0.2 TCF and industrial
consumption has increased by about 0.75 TCF (EIA, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_cons_sum_dcu_
nus_a.htm). Net exports have increased by 2.5 TCF, though they remain negative (EIA, http://www.eia.
gov/dnav/ng/ng_sum_sndm_s1_m.htm). The United States has negative net exports because it imports more
natural gas than it exports, even when accounting for increased natural gas supply due to fracking. Most imported gas
is from Canada.
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Total carbon emissions from electricity generation declined from 284.7 thousand tons/hour in 2008
to 253.0 thousand tons/hour in 2013. The decline of 31.7 thousand tons/hour, equal to 11.1% of the
total, was due to a variety of factors – increased renewable generation, slightly decreased demand,
lower gas prices, and increased natural gas generating capacity.
This paper investigates the effects of lower gas prices, caused by increased natural gas produc-
tion, on electric sector greenhouse gas emissions. I study the two primary channels that have been
affected. I first examine how falling natural gas prices affect regional carbon emissions from elec-
tricity generation over the short run. Cheaper natural gas replaces relatively more expensive coal
in the generation order; carbon emissions decrease because natural gas releases roughly half of the
carbon that coal releases. I next consider the effect of falling natural gas prices on carbon emissions
through unanticipated generation capacity additions.4 Construction of gas-fired power plants has
greatly exceeded projections made prior to the dramatic decrease in the natural gas price. Many of
these new gas-fired power plants would not have been constructed if gas prices had remained high.
I empirically estimate the relationship between carbon emissions and natural gas prices using
a flexible model that also includes electricity demand and a rich set of controls. My specification
allows me to separately identify the effects of lower gas prices and increased gas-fired generation
capacity. I also examine the interaction of these two effects. While carbon emissions reductions
due to low gas prices are only available if prices remain low, reductions due to new capital stock
will likely persist at moderately higher gas prices. This type of effect has been demonstrated before
by Davis and Kilian (2011) in the home-heating market.
I exploit short-term variation in gas prices to identify the effect of gas prices on carbon emis-
sions. There are two primary sources of this variation. The first is weather shocks, which influence
gas prices in the short term. Unexpectedly cold weather forecasts boost demand for natural gas
because many US homes are heated using gas. Unexpectedly temperate weather forecasts de-
creases demand. Finally, unexpectedly hot weather forecasts indicate increased air conditioning
usage, increasing demand for electricity (and consequently increasing demand for gas). The sec-
ond source of variation is production and storage reports. For example, unexpectedly high storage
withdrawal, unexpectedly low storage injection, or unexpectedly low production reports will all
4During the previous period of low natural gas prices in the early 2000’s there also was a large natural gas-fired
capacity expansion.
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increase the price of natural gas.56
I carefully control for the endogeneity of the price of natural gas. This endogeneity concern
arises due to correlated demand shocks that may directly change both gas prices and electricity
demand. For example, unseasonably warm winter weather may decrease both gas prices and elec-
tricity demand. This would cause my estimates to overstate emissions decreases attributable to
lower gas prices. I control for this by including electricity demand directly in my specification.
Additionally, it is possible that as gas prices fall, electricity prices may also fall (increasing the
demand for electricity and, therefore, carbon emissions). Including electricity demand in my spec-
ification allows me to shut down this channel.
Next, I construct a counterfactual of what emissions would have been had natural gas prices
remained at their higher levels prior to the large-scale application of fracking. In doing so, I
control for renewable production and electricity demand levels. This allows me to answer my first
research question; I find that lower gas prices caused 2013 carbon emissions to decrease by 14,700
tons/hour.
Falling natural gas prices may also influence carbon emissions through additions of new capital
stock. This new capital stock may displace dirtier coal-fired power plants. I first determine the
portion of new capital stock constructed in response to lower gas prices. This is a difficult question.
I take three different approaches and conclude that 65-85% can be attributed to falling natural gas
prices. In my first approach, I regress construction starts on gas prices and electricity demand
growth. My second approach compares projections of capital additions from the EIA’s Annual
Energy Outlook with actual construction. This model makes its forecasts using aggregate data – it
is a “macro” model. My final approach compares projections of capital additions from Form EIA-
860 with actual construction. The form uses micro data submitted by utilities and independent
power producers.7 I use the range produced by these three approaches to estimate the amount of
new capital stock constructed because of low gas prices. I also consider other potential causes of
above-expectation gas-fired capacity construction. It is difficult to conclusively rule them out, but
on balance the evidence points to lower gas prices caused by fracking.
To determine how newly constructed capacity has altered carbon emissions, I rely on the rela-
5Although gas prices have decreased over the long term as fracking has become more prevalent, variation caused
by long-run supply changes is difficult to isolate from other trends that change emissions, such as macroeconomic
conditions, increasing attention to energy efficiency, and technological improvements. For this reason, I use short-run
variation.
6Additional details about the sources of gas price variation are available in Appendix B.1.
7The Annual Energy Outlook is based, in part, on data from the Form EIA-860. It is combined with other data in
order to make projections.
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tionship between carbon emissions and electricity demand. Identification of this relationship also
relies on short-term variation, and weather again is a key source of this variation.
In order to construct counterfactual emissions where new gas-fired capacity does not exist,
I first determine hour-by-hour electricity generation and carbon emissions from the new capital
stock. Then, I use the coefficients on electricity demand to determine what marginal emissions
would have been if this electricity was instead generated by the existing power plant fleet. The
difference between actual emissions and counterfactual emissions reveals the emissions savings
caused by the new capital stock. I estimate 2013 carbon reductions from new capacity to be an
additional 2,100 tons/hour.
There are several related studies of the relationship between gas prices and carbon emissions.
Lu, Salovaara and McElroy (2012) examine the effect of gas prices on emissions by EPA region us-
ing monthly data over a two-year period. They find that between 2008 and 2009, carbon emissions
fell by 8.76% in the electric sector, 4.3% of which was due to falling natural gas prices. This paper
uses hourly data over a seven-year period to provide more robust and comprehensive estimates and
also looks at new gas-fired construction.8 Cullen and Mansur (2014) estimate the relationship be-
tween gas prices and carbon emissions in order to analyze the industry response to a tax on carbon
emissions. While their analysis relates emissions to the gas price, they do not specifically address
the effect of recent gas price declines on carbon emissions or the effects of new capital stock. 9,10
My paper fits in a broader literature that estimates the effects of natural gas prices on the power
sector (Holladay and LaRiviere, 2014; Linn, Muehlenbachs and Wang, 2014). It is also relevant
within the literature that estimates greenhouse gas emissions from the electric sector (Kaffine,
McBee and Lieskovsky, 2013; Callaway, Fowlie and McCormick, 2015; Linn, Mastrangelo and
Burtraw, 2014; Cullen, 2013; Novan, 2014).
The paper proceeds as follows. I provide some institutional background to help frame the
analysis (Section 2.2). Next, I analyze the amount of new generation capacity prompted by low
gas prices (Section 2.3). I briefly discuss my data (Section 2.4). I detail my empirical model and
8Hourly data is less reflective of medium-run trends, such as climate policy, than more smoothed monthly data.
Even with hourly data, there is still a concern that medium-run trends affect both the gas price and emissions; the
added years of data allow for the inclusion of a time trend and monthly fixed effects to help control for this. Using
NERC interconnections alleviates concerns about cross-region electricity trading.
9Lafrancois (2012) estimates the potential effect of gas-fired power plants constructed before 2006 on carbon
emissions.
10Engineering models such as Venkatesh et al. (2012) have also looked at this topic. They use simplified dispatch
models to estimate how the marginal supply curve will change. While this approach has its advantages, it may be less
precise for marginal changes. Transmission losses and costs, bottlenecks, ramping costs, market power, and outages
may make it so that some power plants are more likely to provide power than their marginal cost would suggest.
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results in Sections 2.5 and 2.6. I consider alternative specifications to check the robustness of my
results, then discuss, and conclude (Sections 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9).
2.2 Background
There are a several institutional details that are important to my analysis. For the vast majority of
American consumers, electricity prices do not vary in real time. Thus, electricity demand does not
adjust in real-time in response to changing wholesale electricity prices – it is almost completely
inelastic in the short-run. Over the medium-run, demand has the potential to adjust in response.
Electricity prices have been relatively stable in real terms recently. Between 2007 and 2013 the real
annual national average price of electricity fluctuated between 9.35 and 9.98 cents per kilowatt-
hour (EIA).11 Electricity consumption has also been relatively constant. In the discussion section,
I examine the potential medium-run demand response.
It is important to note that manipulation of the price of natural gas is not a concern for my
estimation. Gas power plants are price-takers and are unable to manipulate the price of natural gas.
The natural gas market is large and groups of power plants are unable to substantially move the
market. Additionally, it is the case that power plants with long-term contracts are not required to
burn gas at any individual time. Thus, whether a plant has a favorable or unfavorable long-term
contract (or no long-term contract) has little bearing on whether they decide to supply electricity.
The opportunity cost of producing electricity is the spot price of natural gas that firms pay.12
2.2.1 Interconnection Analysis
For my analysis, I focus on the NERC interconnection level as in Graff Zivin, Kotchen and Mansur
(2014). Figure 2.1 illustrates the location and boundaries of the three interconnections and regions
within each that the NERC oversees. The interconnections are largely separate entities, with mini-
mal electricity trading between each interconnection. The Western interconnection (WECC) covers
most of the territory from New Mexico up to Montana and west. The Texas interconnection (TRE)
covers most of Texas. The Eastern interconnection is subdivided into six different regional entities
that comprise the rest of the United States.
Figure 2.2 shows power flows between different regions. For reference, one million megawatt
hours over the course of a year are equivalent to an average of roughly 115 megawatts during
every hour. Electricity flows between interconnections (circled) are very small. Regions with
11This is across all segments, not just residential consumption. Monthly data has a little more variation. I use 2010
price levels.
12For more on gas markets, please see EIA (2001).
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Figure 2.1: NERC Interconnections
Figure 2.2: Regional Power Flows
large amounts of power trading, like the Chicago area with eastern parts of the RFC (denoted by
the 102 million megawatt hours), would be inappropriate fits for my model. While Canada does
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trade power with the United States, the lines are primarily transmitting hydroelectrically generated
electricity and are full at most hours. Thus, it should have limited effect on the analysis.
A large amount of regional trading threatens clean identification of this relationship. To under-
stand this, consider two regions, the Midwest Reliability Organization (MRO) and the Southwest
Power Pool (SPP). MRO has large amounts of coal capacity, while SPP has a mixture of coal and
natural gas. Assume that the regions trade freely and have large amounts of transmission capacity
between them. Additionally, assume electricity demand remains fixed. As the price of natural gas
decreases, more gas and less coal will be burnt. This would mean that in aggregate carbon dioxide
emissions would decrease. However, it could be the case that power generation has increased in
SPP and decreased in MRO, with SPP sending excess generation to MRO. SPP would then show
an increase in emissions at lower gas prices, while MRO shows a larger than deserved decrease. A
system with minimal trading prevents this potential identification issue.
2.2.2 Gas Prices and the Dispatch Curve
There has been substantial variation in the natural gas price over the last several years. The spot
price of gas at Henry Hub, the most important trading location, does an excellent job of capturing
this variation. United States gas markets are fairly integrated, with most other locations trading at
a basis against Henry Hub. For example, natural gas in Chicago is generally about 10 cents per
MMBtu (2-5%) more expensive than natural gas at Henry Hub.
Figure 2.3: Gas Prices, Oil Prices, and Shale Production
(a) (b)
Figure 2.3 examines changes in the natural gas market that have been occurring since 2007.
The panel on the left (a) plots the relationship between the Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price and
the quantity of shale gas that is produced in North America. It demonstrates that as the supply of
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shale gas has increased, the price of natural gas has decreased. The vast majority of shale gas is
drilled using hydraulic fracturing. Note that the first three years of shale data were only collected
annually, though quantities are generally small. Additionally, the gas price is a monthly average.
This figure depicts the long-term trend, though it obscures the day-to-day variation in gas prices
that is key to my identification strategy.
The panel on the right (b) plots the price of gas at Henry Hub against the Brent oil price.13
Oil and gas are energy sources that are, to a certain extent, substitutable. Prior to the large-scale
implementation of fracking, oil and gas closely tracked each other, with a barrel of oil being about
ten times as expensive as an MMBtu of natural gas14. The graph starts in 1997 when the EIA
Henry Hub spot price time series begins, though the relationship in the early 90’s (using a different
measure of the natural gas price) was also strong. In 2008 there was a recession-induced decline
in the prices of both fuels. Shale gas production greatly increased during the recovery, and the
relationship between gas and oil prices fractured. Oil prices surged back to pre-recession levels,
while gas prices continued their decline. By the end of 2013, a barrel of oil was now twenty-five
times as expensive as one MMBtu of natural gas.15
If macroeconomic conditions were the only important changes in energy markets, gas prices
would likely have rebounded similar to the oil price rebound (Hausman and Kellogg, 2015). The
fractured relationship is possible because oil is traded on a global market, whereas natural gas
markets are regional (Kilian, 2015). Fracking has also produced a US oil boom, but it hasn’t had
as large of an effect on the world price of oil because the global oil market is very large and the
oil boom began later. Excess natural gas within the US is unable to be exported in large quantities
outside of North America because of a lack of infrastructure and high transportation costs. Instead,
it is consumed locally at much cheaper prices.
Also included in panel (b) are futures curves from January 2008 for natural gas and crude oil.
The futures curves show that financial markets expected gas and oil prices to retain their historical
relationship over the 2009-2013 period. Financial markets also did not anticipate the large decline
in gas prices.
As discussed in the introduction, total gas production in the US increased by 5 trillion cubic
feet per year, or 20%, between 2007 and 2012. The combination of a large increase in quantity
13Brent oil is the major world oil price. Oil prices in Cushing, Oklahoma are similar, though they have been slightly
lower because of pipeline constraints.
14That is, oil was about twice as expensive on a per-MMBtu basis
15For more on the relationship between oil and gas prices, please see Villar and Joutz (2006); Ramberg and Parsons
(2012) and EIA (2012).
37
supplied and a large decrease in the price of natural gas is strongly suggestive of a large rightward
shift of the natural gas supply curve.
The price of natural gas is an important factor in electric-sector carbon emissions. In some areas
of the country, firms bid in real-time to determine who is going to supply the marginal kilowatt-
hour. Nuclear and renewable power plants have very low marginal costs. As a result, nearly all
marginal power is provided by either coal or natural gas-fired plants. In other areas of the country, a
centralized dispatch authority determines which plants produce power. One of the authority’s main
objectives is to minimize generation costs. Changing fuel costs will prompt a dispatch authority to
adjust the generation mix.
Fuel is the primary variable cost at fossil fuel power plants. Moderate to high natural gas prices
usually cause coal to have lower variable costs than coal, making it the first fuel called upon to
generate electricity. At lower gas prices, the marginal cost of electricity generated from gas will
decrease and gas will begin to displace coal in the generation order. This switching between coal
and natural gas is the key mechanism driving the results in this paper. Switching is able to happen
within a period of hours.
2.3 Cheap Gas and Gas-Fired Capacity Additions
Most forecasters and industry analysts were expecting only very minor gas-fired capacity increases
between 2010 and 2013. Instead, 25.9 GW of gas-fired capacity was added over this timeframe.
It is difficult to isolate the precise effect of fracking on new gas-fired capacity additions. I take
three approaches to answering this question, which all yield similar results. First, I run a set of
simple regressions that estimate the relationship between the gas price and construction starts.
One weakness of this approach is the limited sample. Next, I examine projections made by the
EIA in their Annual Energy Outlook projections. Finally, I consider data about potential projects
that are filed with the EIA using their EIA-860 form.16 I look at these projections because they
were made before fracking; differences from the projections can plausibly be ascribed to fracking.
I estimate that roughly 65%-85% of these additions likely would not have happened if the gas price
had remained at 2008 levels.
A gas-fired power plant takes between 18 and 36 months to construct. Natural gas prices
crashed in mid-2008, suggesting that the earliest gas plants built because of low gas prices would
likely have come online in 2010. While it is likely that a few suspended projects were restarted
and completed by 2009, I do not consider these plants.
16Note that the AEO projections are based, in part, on the raw EIA-860 data.
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My analysis includes both combined cycle and conventional combustion turbines.17 New com-
bined cycle plants primarily supplant less efficient coal-fired plants, while new combustion turbine
plants could displace the least efficient coal-fired plants during shoulder periods, as well as less
efficient (oil or gas) peaker plants during peak hours. However, emissions savings from new com-
bustion turbines are likely to be minimal – new combined cycle plants likely drive the results in
this paper.
It is difficult to disentangle the effects of natural gas prices from contemporaneous trends such
as state renewable portfolio standards, changing environmental regulations, or the great recession. I
briefly consider the effect each of these trends might have had on gas-fired generation construction.
While not definitive, these considerations support the theory that gas prices were the major driver
of gas-fired capacity additions.
2.3.1 Construction Starts Regression Analysis
I first consider a regression-based approach to determine the relationship between gas prices and
estimated gas-fired construction starts. Prior to the regressions, I use data from Form EIA-860 to
estimate construction starts.18 The data summarizes construction completions (e.g., 20.1 GW in
2004 and 14.8 GW in 2005); I use an 18-month lead to estimate construction starts for each year
(e.g. 17.4 GW in 2003).19 Using lead completions data as an estimate of construction starts instead
of actual construction starts allows me to capture some intermediate effects. For example, some
power plants are begun, but later “indefinitely postponed.” Lead completions estimates appropri-
ately account for plants that were indefinitely postponed and later restarted, as well as the lower
likelihood of such postponements when firms expect a long-term supply of inexpensive natural
gas.
The Annual Energy Outlook also reports construction completions. Their data is based on the
EIA-860, though it is compiled differently.20 As a check, I use both the EIA-860 and AEO datasets
in my analysis.
Using data from 2000-2011, I estimate the annual relationship between construction starts (in
17Approximately 65% of this new gas-fired capacity was from combined cycle plants.
18The raw EIA-860 data are aggregated in the Electric Power Annual (EPA). I use aggregated data in the EPA
because disaggregated data on gas-fired construction starts from the EIA-860 are unavailable for some years due to
changes to EIA’s data collection procedures.
19I choose an 18-month lead because it allows for the best fit with the available micro data on construction starts. In
Appendix B.2 I provide a range of alternative lead times; results are similar.
20The raw EIA-860 data are aggregated in the Electric Power Annual. I use aggregated data because disaggregated
data on gas-fired construction starts from the EIA-860 are unavailable for some years due to changes to EIA’s data
collection procedures.
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megawatts) and electricity demand growth and the price of natural gas. Specifically, I estimate:
LoggedConstructionStarts(Ct) = α0 + β1P
NG
t + β2ElecGrowtht + εt (2.1)
The price of natural gas and electricity demand growth are the two primary drivers of gas-fired
capacity investments. Gas prices determine the marginal cost of operating plants, while demand
growth helps determine future wholesale electricity prices. I consider two variations of the depen-
dent variable, using either AEO or EIA-860 data.
A limitation of this estimation is that the number of data points in this time series is only 11 or
12, depending on the data source.21 More reliable estimates would result from including additional
controls, making the independent variables more flexible, and adjusting the standard errors. Data
limitations prevent these adjustments. Nevertheless, this estimation allows for a rough look at the
relationship between gas prices and construction starts. I have summarized the results in Table 2.1.
While the magnitude of the gas price coefficient varies across the regressions (including the
ones in Appendix B.2), it is consistently negative. To determine the counterfactual construction,
I first determine the difference between actual gas prices in each year and the counterfactual (no-
fracking) gas price from 2008. I then adjust construction starts in each year down by the counter-
factual gas price difference multiplied by the gas price coefficient. This allows me to determine, in
rows [c] through [g], what counterfactual construction would have been.
In 2009, construction estimates do not change because of the way this analysis is constructed
– it takes more than 12 months to have an effect. However, starting in 2010, counterfactual con-
struction is frequently lower than it otherwise would have been. Much of the time it is close to
zero or negative. I interpret negative construction to mean that it is very undesirable to build a gas
plant, not that gas plants are being decommissioned. Years in which there is positive construction
are highlighted.
Finally, I compare actual plant construction from 2010 to 2013 with counterfactual plant con-
struction. I take the 25.9 GW of stock that was actually constructed and subtract construction in
any year with a positive counterfactual. For example, in column [2], I subtract (1.5 + 3.6 + 2.8 +
1.7 = ) 9.6 GW that would have been built even if gas prices remained high. Negative construction
is treated as a zero.
Depending on the specification, this analysis suggests either 16.2 or 22.1 GW of gas-fired
capacity was constructed that would not otherwise have been built. Note that the EIA-860 plant
21In Appendix B.2 I include a scatterplot of these points, as well as a line of best fit.
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Table 2.1: Regression Results: Counterfactual Plant Construction
data do not include 2013 construction or counterfactual construction.
2.3.2 Annual Energy Outlook Projections
In the mid-2000s, the EIA estimated that there would only be very modest investment in natural
gas-fired electric generation capacity. The available capital stock would be mostly sufficient to
meet growth in electricity demand. Further, it would not be profitable to invest in new capac-
ity while old capacity was working well. The 2007 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) projections
suggested that there would be roughly 2 GW of natural gas capacity added during the 2010-2013
timeframe. As Figure 2.4 shows, this was not a one-year aberration; projections in surrounding
years were also very similar.
However, the solid black column in Figure 2.4 indicates that actual capacity additions were
substantially above initial projections. The 25.9 GW of capacity that was built between 2010 and
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Figure 2.4: Projected vs. Actual Natural Gas Capacity Additions
2013 is much higher than these projections.
I next look to see how close previous AEO projections were to actual construction. It is pos-
sible that the AEO’s black box model regularly underestimates short to medium-run gas-capacity
additions. To be conservative and allow for this possibility, I adjust the 2006-2008 AEO projec-
tions up by the amount that previous projections missed by. I view this as conservative in part
because AEO projections are intended to be unbiased. Table 2.2 details this analysis.
I look at both five-year (columns [1] to [3]) and ten-year projections (columns [4] to [6]) in the
same way. In the top panel I analyze projections made between 2001 and 2004 to determine how
accurate they were. These projections are mostly before the advent of fracking and are mostly free
from its influence. In the five-year projection, total construction averaged 147% above projection.
Ten-year construction averaged 22% above projection.22
In the bottom panel, I analyze 2006-2008 projections for construction between 2010 and 2013.
All three years projected minimal construction during these years. To adjust for previous under-
projections, I multiply the 2006-2008 projections by ratio of actual/projected construction that I
22Note that these results are driven in part by 2004 projections (row [d]), which are most likely to be influenced by

































calculate in the upper panel (row [e], in bold). Even after I adjust for previous errors (columns [2]
and [5]), the expected level of construction was much lower than actual construction. Adjusting for
previous projection errors, this analysis suggests between 18 and 22 gigawatts of natural gas-fired
capacity was constructed that would not otherwise have been.
2.3.3 Raw EIA-860 Projections
Proposed electricity plants are required to file the EIA-860 form if “[t]he plant will be primarily
fueled by energy sources other than coal or nuclear energy and is expected to begin commercial op-
eration within 5 years.” This form details proposed plants, which are in various stages of planning
or construction, but are not generally certain to be completed. When using the raw EIA-860 data,
I view it as a soft cap on the possible number of projects that will be built over the next 5 years.23
To construct a plant within the next five years that is not already in the database, a firm would need
to complete the siting, planning and construction phases. This can be done, but it requires a very
smooth process.
To determine how many of these projects are completed during pre-fracking (normal) times, I
look at summaries of EIA-860 data from 2001 through 2003. As Table 2.3 shows, on average 59%
of potential projects were completed during these years. In contrast, when I look at projections
from 2006 through 2008, years that mostly overlap with fracking, I see that 101% of potential
projects are completed. That is, during regular times, half of all projects are completed. When
gas-fired plants become much more profitable because their marginal costs tremendously decline,
slightly more projects are completed than were planned.
This suggests that without fracking (and lower gas prices), roughly one half of all projects
would have been completed – the other half was induced by very cheap natural gas prices. Looking
at the most recent projection for which I have five years of actual construction data (2007), I
estimate that 17.5 GW of additional capacity were induced by cheap natural gas.
2.3.4 Alternative Explanations
There are a number of possible alternative explanations for the surge in gas-fired construction. I
now briefly consider several of them. While I am unable to conclusively rule them out, they do not
appear to be the main driver of new plant construction.
23This raw data is summarized in the Electric Power Annual.
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Table 2.3: EIA-860 Analysis: Counterfactual Plant Construction
State Renewable Portfolio Standards
Renewable Portfolio Standards have been enacted at the state level in twenty-nine of the lower
48 states (and the District of Columbia). Nineteen states, generally in the mountain region or
southeast, had either voluntary goals or no legislation.24 While standards vary across states, they
broadly seek to increase the amount of power generated from renewable sources. These stan-
dards likely disincentivize gas-fired construction because renewable generation will cover much
of future electricity growth. However, when building new fossil-fuel plants, they could also in-
centivize additional gas-fired power plants (at the expense of coal-fired plants) because gas-fired
24http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850.
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generation better complements the less predictable nature of renewable power. Using Texas data,
Dorsey-Palmateer (2014) finds that the primary effect of wind generation is to reduce fossil fuel
consumption. That is, the first effect would likely outweigh the second, and in the absence of
renewable portfolio standards, gas-fired construction would likely have been even larger.
I now look to see if a disproportionate share of construction was in states with renewable
portfolio standards. The twenty-nine states with standards contained 72% of the US population.
They also constructed 76% of the 227 new gas-fired units built over the 2010-2013 period (note
that plants can have multiple units). This (very broad) overview does not suggest a large effect due
to renewable portfolio standards, as there was also substantial construction in states without these
standards.
Great Recession
The Great Recession began in December of 2007 and ended in June of 2009. In this section, I have
used projections that were issued between 2005 and early 2008. For example, section 2.3.2 uses the
2007 AEO projection issued in early 2007 before the onset of the recession. Following the onset
of the recession, capital expenditures across the US economy fell substantially. If the construction
projections accounted for the upcoming Great Recession, they likely would have predicted an even
lower amount of new gas-fired power plant construction. That is to say, while the effects of the
Great Recession are not captured in this analysis, the recession likely muted the effect of lower gas
prices.
Changing Environmental Regulations
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) involves ten states in the Northeastern US (plus
PA as an observer). It went into effect in 2009 in an attempt to limit carbon emissions. Similarly,
California implemented a cap & trade program in 2013. These programs will increase the cost
of emitting carbon (up from zero) and some of these costs may be passed on to consumers in the
form of higher electricity prices. The effect on natural gas-fired plants is ambiguous – they are
cleaner than coal-fired generation, but dirtier than renewables. The twelve states (Northeast plus
California) make up about 33% of US population, and have built 38% of new gas-fired generation
units. I do not interpret this finding as evidence that carbon regulations have been driving gas-fired
investments.25
25Interestingly, California has built more than its share of new generation while the Northeast has built less. This
could be related to population growth that is above the national average in California and well below the national
average in the northeast.
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Coal-fired power plants are the largest source of mercury emissions in the United States. It is
possible that changing mercury regulations have influenced the decision to build gas-fired plants.
At the national level, Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) are being developed by the EPA.
They were originally proposed in March 2011, but have been under revision since then. As of April
2015, the standards look like they will be upheld.26 It is possible that these standards influenced
borderline plants to continue completion. It is unlikely that MATS caused new plants to be con-
ceived and constructed between 2010 and 2013 because of the uncertainty surrounding the revision
and the amount of time required to build a new power plant. Additionally, 2011’s large amount of
construction completions, which was likely unaffected by the MATS proposal, provides evidence
that new construction was economic without the benefit of MATS. However, I cannot conclusively
rule out MATS as a driver of gas-fired construction.
The Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) was originally proposed by the EPA in 2003 with the
aim of reducing emissions of particulate matter, nitrogen oxide, and sulfur dioxide. After a lengthy
legal battle, CAIR was remanded in 2008 and the EPA was ordered to address several problems
with the regulation. The EPA finalized the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) in 2011, and
phase I took effect at the start of 2015. The primary effect of the law is to reduce pollution from
coal-fired power plants through additional technological controls or reduced generation. Natural
gas plants emit less conventional (non-carbon) pollution when compared with coal-fired plants. As
a result, I expect the net effect of the regulation to promote gas-fired and renewable generation
at the expense of coal. CSAPR and/or CAIR were designed to affect 31 states and the District
of Columbia. These states comprised 75% of the US population, but only 60% of the new gas-
fired construction. I interpret this as evidence that CSAPR is not the primary driver of new gas-
fired construction. States where CAIR/CSAPR promote gas-fired generation had a lower than
representative percentage of new gas-fired construction.
Alternative Explanations Review
There have been several important changes to the electricity sector over the previous fifteen years.
State renewable portfolio standards and the Great Recession likely disincentivized gas-fired con-
struction. Changing environmental regulations may have promoted gas-fired construction. How-
ever, the affected states do not have a disproportionate share of construction. The regulations also





Estimating the amount of gas-fired construction that is due to lower gas prices is a difficult prob-
lem. In this section, I have taken three approaches. Using a construction regressions approach,
I estimate that between 16.2 and 22.1 GW of gas-fired capacity were added because of low gas
prices. Using differences from AEO projections, I estimate total additions of 18.0 to 22.0 GW.
Finally, using the raw EIA-860 data, I estimate additions to be 17.5 GW. All three approaches pro-
duce similar estimates; I estimate that between 65% and 85% of total additions were prompted by
low gas prices. These estimates are also consistent with the intuition that greatly reducing marginal
production costs (through lower gas prices) will incentivize firms to increase production capacity.
However, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of natural gas prices from other factors affecting
these large capital expenditures. The remainder of this paper turns to studying changes in carbon
emissions from both existing and newly-constructed plants.
2.4 Data
Emissions data are collected by the EPA using the Continuous Emissions Monitoring System
(CEMS). CEMS collects emissions data from all fossil fuel power plant units that have genera-
tion capacity of 25 megawatts or greater. Most power plants generate several hundred megawatts.
Only very small generators (producing small amounts of pollution) are not included; CEMS covers
the vast majority of pollutant-emitting electricity generation in the United States.27 I use hourly
data over the 2007 to 2013 period. Figure 2.5 summarizes carbon dioxide emissions from these
power plants and illustrates the seasonality of electricity generation. Carbon emissions decrease
by a little more than 10% over the time period. A graph of fossil fuel electricity generation by
interconnection looks similar, though electricity generation has remained relatively constant.28
I use hourly electricity demand data from FERC Form 714. Planning areas are geographic
zones that coordinate electricity load to meet demand. The FERC requires each planning area to
submit this report annually. I map planning areas to NERC interconnections and then aggregate
the data by interconnection, allowing me to control for changing demand.29
27I use generators labeled “Electric Utility,” “Cogeneration,” “Small Power Producer” or “Institutional.” I consider
this the backbone of the electric grid. I exclude a range of industrial plants like “Pulp & Paper Mill” or “Cement Plant”
as they frequently do not list electricity generation, but do emit pollutants.
28This is anomalous. For several decades prior to the time period, electricity demand grew fairly steadily by a
couple percent every year.
29For regions where independent system operators (ISOs) report separately from utilities, I only include data from
the ISOs. This prevents double counting. For example, this means that the northeast is comprised only of data reported
by the NYISO and NEISO, California’s data is predominantly from CAISO, etc.
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Figure 2.5: Seven-Day Rolling Average of Carbon Emissions
The EIA requires electricity generators to report monthly information via EIA form 923. I
aggregate and use monthly net generation from renewable power plants.30 Because renewable
generation does not emit carbon dioxide or sulfur dioxide, it is not captured by CEMS.
I include data from the National Weather Service on heating degree days (HDD) and cooling
degree days (CDD).31 I take population-weighted averages for each interconnection.
Finally, I use natural gas spot price data that are collected by the EIA through Thomson Reuters.
They track the natural gas price at Henry Hub.
2.5 Empirics
My analysis is essentially estimating a production function for carbon emissions. I have panel
data on the electricity-generation industry over a period of seven years and am able to repeatedly
30Specifically, I use fuel codes for nuclear, hydroelectric, solar, geothermal, and wind power. This is consistent with
Cullen and Mansur (2014). Less than 1% of generation is reported as a “State-Fuel Level Increment” without a NERC
region. I assign this data to NERC regions. Results are similar if it is omitted.
31The National Weather Service defines HDD and CDD: ”A mean daily temperature (average of the daily maximum
and minimum temperatures) of 65F is the base for both heating and cooling degree day computations. Heating degree
days are summations of negative differences between the mean daily temperature and the 65F base; cooling degree
days are summations of positive differences from the same base. For example, cooling degree days for a station with
daily mean temperatures during a seven-day period of 67, 65, 70, 74, 78, 65 and 68, are 2, 0, 5, 9, 13, 0, and 3, for a
total for the week of 32 cooling degree days.” http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_
monitoring/cdus/degree_days/ddayexp.shtml.
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view their emissions decisions. Given gas prices, electricity demand, and other control variables, I
estimate the causal effect of gas price shocks on carbon emissions. I also estimate the causal effect
of newly constructed gas-fired capacity on carbon emissions.
My identification assumption is that short-run changes in gas prices are uncorrelated with car-
bon emissions except through dispatch changes. After including appropriate controls, these price
changes are orthogonal to other determinants of carbon emissions. Similarly, when estimating the
causal effect of newly constructed gas-fired capacity, I assume that the electricity demand coeffi-
cients represent the marginal emissions from the power plants they are replacing. Gas price and
electricity demand changes are exogenously caused and the resulting errors are uncorrelated with
carbon emissions.
I run my analysis separately for each hour of the day. As Graff Zivin, Kotchen and Mansur
(2014) show, marginal emissions can vary widely from hour to hour. If new gas-fired generators
are running overnight they will likely be providing baseload power and replacing coal power plants.
This will have a large effect on emissions. However, if the new generators are primarily running
during peak hours of demand, they could just be replacing older gas-fired plants, providing minimal
emissions savings.
I focus on the interconnection level (Western, Eastern, & Texas). Electricity demand is reported
at the planning area. Due to changes in planning area geography, some planning areas move from
one region to another region or cover multiple regions during my time period. For example, MISO
(a planning area) covers parts of MRO, RFC, and SERC. Because of this and because of substantial
trading across regions (Section 2.2.1), I do not report individual regional estimates for the Eastern
interconnection.
2.5.1 Decrease in Emissions from Switching
My primary specification is run at the daily level (t) and is estimated separately for each inter-
connection and hour.32 It estimates the relationship between total (carbon) emissions (TEt) ag-
gregated across the interconnection and the national price of natural gas (PNGt ), controlling for
interconnection-level electricity demand (QEt ), renewable electricity generation (Renewablest),
Heating Degree Days (HDDt), and Cooling Degree Days (CDDt). I also include a flexible time
trend (Datet) and month of year fixed effects (Dm). Finally, I include an interaction term between
the gas price and the demand spline. I use a cubic spline, s(), with six knot points to allow for
32That is, each of the three interconnections runs the specification twenty-four times, for a total of seventy-two
regressions.
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flexibility in the relationship between emissions and the price of natural gas, electricity demand,
renewables, and the time trend. The shape of the spline does not strongly depend on the number
of knots. I choose six to be consistent with Cullen & Mansur (2014).33
TotalEmissions(TEt) = α0 + s(P
NG
t ) + s(Q
E
t ) + 1{PNGt > med(PNGt )} ∗ s(QEt )
+ s(HDDt) + s(CDDt) + s(Renewablest) + s(Datet) + γDm + εt (2.2)
I control for electricity demand for two reasons. Most importantly, including demand will
eliminate a major source of possible endogeneity from, e.g., macroeconomic conditions or weather
conditions. If the recent economic downturn were correlated with the fall in natural gas prices, the
results could be biased. The economic downturn would cause lower emissions through lower gas
prices, but also through a decrease in electricity generation. Thus, the analysis could overstate
the decrease in emissions caused by the decrease in the natural gas price. Similarly, if warmer
summers increased gas prices and electricity consumption, they would cause bias. In this case,
higher gas prices would be correlated with higher consumption and increased coal consumption.
This could also cause the analysis to overstate the decrease in emissions caused by the decrease in
the natural gas price.
The second reason that I include electricity demand is that over the medium-to-long run lower
gas prices may cause lower electricity prices, increasing the quantity demanded of electricity. To
the extent that medium run effects exist, including demand as a control allows me to isolate the
first-order effect of gas prices on carbon emissions. While including demand directly in the model
is unconventional, it is likely appropriate in the electricity sector. I assume that, in the short-
run, demand is determined exogenously outside the model. This is reasonable because prices are
generally not available in real time, thus fixing the quantity of electricity demand over short periods
of time.
It is important to control for the level of renewable generation because renewable generation
directly replaces conventional generation. Wind and solar patterns are seasonal and cause renew-
able electricity generation to also be seasonal. For instance, in the Western interconnection, winds
are strongest around April and are generally much weaker in October. Therefore, renewable pro-
duction peaks in April and is much lower in the late fall. Gas prices are also seasonal. Failing to
control for the variation inherent in renewable electricity production would cause bias.
33For the spline on HDD and CDD I use three knots. The ambient temperature ranges are too small to allow for six
knots.
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While electricity demand and carbon emissions data are hourly and gas prices are daily, renew-
able electricity generation is only available at the monthly level. Renewable generation has very
low marginal costs. As a result, it should always come before gas and coal in the dispatch order.
On a day-to-day level, it is not very correlated with gas prices. Thus, the lack of granularity in the
data will only cause very limited bias in my results.34,35,36
It is possible that failing to control for generator efficiency changes caused by changes in am-
bient temperature causes my results to be overstated. This could be the case, e.g., because hot
days increase both carbon emissions and electricity demand or the gas price. Hotter days may
cause generators to operate less efficiently, directly increasing gas usage and carbon emissions.
They could also increase electricity demand (air conditioning) or the gas price (more demand for
electricity). Controlling for ambient temperature will prevent this type of bias.
HDD and CDD are better suited to analyze temperature’s effect on generator efficiency than
raw temperature. A raw temperature average could disguise important temperature heterogeneity.
For example, if the Western interconnection had a temperature of 68 F in all areas, this would result
in a raw average temperature of 65 F, HDD of 0, CDD of 0, and very little effect on generator
efficiency. However, it could also be the case that California is very hot and the rest of the west
is very cold. Here, the population-weighted average temperature would still be 65 F, but the HDD
could be 10 and the CDD could be 10. Generator efficiency would differ from the former case.
Using HDD and CDD allows me to more accurately capture the effect of ambient temperature on
carbon emissions through generator efficiency.
I include month-of-year dummies to control for residual seasonal variation not captured by my
renewables data. This might arise because of seasonal generator maintenance. The flexible time
trend is used to control for trends through time. In particular, the generation mix and international
34In section 2.7.1 I check the robustness of this assumption using hourly wind data that are available only in the
Texas interconnection. In all years of my sample, wind, wood, and hydroelectric power are by far the largest sources
of renewable power. For more, please see the EIA’s Electric Power Monthly, table 1.1.A: http://www.eia.gov/
electricity/monthly/.
35It is possible bias could result from cloudy periods. They are cooler, resulting lower electricity demand and lower
solar-powered generation. The extent to which this causes bias is likely minimal. In 2013 (the year in my sample with
the largest amount of solar generation), solar produced 9 GWh of power in the United States. Total US generation in
2013 was 4.1 million GWh, making solar responsible for less than 0.01% of total 2013 generation. For more, please see
the EIA’s Electric Power Monthly, tables 1.1 and 1.1.A: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/.
36It is also possible that hydroelectric generation is correlated with gas prices. This could happen because operators
are able to produce electricity when gas prices are relatively high within the same month. This is unlikely because it
requires that operators know whether near future prices will be higher or lower than current prices. Predicting future
gas prices is very difficult. To the extent that this hydroelectric generation is correlated with gas prices, this would
work against finding results in this paper. Because operators would be providing more renewable power when gas
prices are high, the gas price spline would be flatter.
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demand for coal are changing slowly over time. Including the time trend allows me to control for
these changes. The time trend is likely sufficient to control for new capacity additions. While they
are important, it is not the case that they are large relative to the existing generation stock; they
increase the generation stock by roughly 6%.37 Note that while I can control for the effect the
changing generation mix has on the gas price spline, it does not preclude me from estimating its
effects on carbon emissions. As discussed below, the effects of the generation mix are estimated
by looking at the demand spline.
Marginal emissions, which new gas-fired plants are displacing, could vary with the gas price
because the dispatch order of power plants adjusts as gas prices change. The interaction term,
1{PNGt > med(PNGt )} ∗ s(QEt ), allows me to examine how high gas prices interact with the
demand spline. The term is a “high gas price demand spline.” It is constructed by finding the
median gas price over my time period and creating a dummy if the gas price is above the median.
I then multiply this dummy by a demand spline to allow for marginal emissions from demand to
vary when the gas price moves above the median.38
Previous literature sometimes uses the ratio of the natural gas to the coal price as an independent
variable. I prefer to omit the coal price because the coal price is in part determined by the natural
gas price.39 If natural gas were more expensive, demand for coal would be substantially higher. I
aim to capture the total effect of increased natural gas supplies on carbon emissions through gas
and coal prices - not only through the price of natural gas itself. I consider specifications with a
coal price in Appendix B.5; results are similar to those using only gas prices.
The Durbin-Watson statistic suggests that autocorrelation may be an issue. I use Newey-West
standard errors with seven lags. I choose seven lags for two reasons. First, it is a full week. It is
possible that a firm’s decision today (e.g., Tuesday) is correlated with Monday’s decision, as well
as the decision that they took on the previous Tuesday. Second, Greene (2012) recommends using
the fourth root of the number of observations, which in this case is just under seven.
Aggregate calculations which combine results from several regressions use bootstrapped stan-
dard errors. I use block bootstrapping with 1,000 replications to mimic the possible autocorrelation
37If I use year-of-sample dummies instead of a time trend, the resulting price spline is qualitatively similar, but
somewhat flatter. Gas prices are consistently high in the first two years, and consistently low in the last four years. The
inclusion of year-of-sample dummies causes the estimation to struggle with the transition between the (pre-fracking)
high gas price regime and the (post-fracking) low gas price regime.
38The median gas price in my sample is about $4/MMBtu. I also run the analysis using $6/MMBtu as the break
point. Results are similar.
39Note that while fracking likely causes the coal price to exogenously change, the coal price is also driven by trends
like changing international demand. My specification controls for trends over time, but directly including the coal
price would not allow me to control for these trends.
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in the data. Where possible, I have compared analytic standard errors with bootstrapped standard
errors for accuracy. They are similar.
2.5.2 Decrease in Emissions from New Natural Gas Capacity
The key relationship when estimating the decrease in emissions from new natural gas capacity is
between emissions and the electricity demand spline. The CEMS database allows me to directly
calculate how much electricity was generated by newly constructed power plants, as well as the
carbon that was emitted when generating the electricity. This power would otherwise have been
produced by the old generation stock. Using the actual conditions at the time of power generation,
I generate counterfactual emissions by increasing electricity demand and moving up along the
demand spline by the amount of power that new plants are generating. A simple comparison
between actual emissions from the newly constructed plants and marginal emissions from the
counterfactual reveals the decrease in carbon emissions caused by these new facilities.40,41
I have aggregated generation from gas-fired plants constructed between 2010 and 2013. Fig-
ure 2.6 demonstrates that they have played an increasingly large role in US power generation.
New plants are most important in the Eastern interconnection; their contributions in the Texas and
WECC are considerably smaller. By the end of 2013, well over 10 GW of generation is supplied
at any one time by these plants. On average, the US is generating about 450 GW of electricity –
meaning that new gas-fired power plants made up about 3% of total US generation in 2013.
At this point the reader may be concerned that I do not control for new capacity additions,
which could alter the shape of the gas price or demand splines. This is not likely to be a problem
because the capacity additions are small relative to the existing capacity stock.42 The time trend
controls for much of these changes. Any residual bias would work against finding results in this
paper because new gas-fired capacity allows for lower emissions levels and will flatten the gas
price and demand splines.43 A flatter gas price spline would cause emissions savings from lower
gas prices to be (marginally) underestimated and my estimate of emissions savings from new plants
40This approach is similar to the one taken by Davis and Hausman (2014).
41My analysis does not consider the effect of delayed gas retirements or accelerated coal retirements due to low gas
prices. These changes also yielded benefits to the extent that they shifted generation away from coal-fired sources.
One important difference between adjusted retirement dates and new construction is that new construction will have a
lifespan of several decades, while retirement adjustments only affect the marginal years surrounding retirement.
42Between 2007 and 2013, about 50 GW of natural gas capacity was added, relative to the existing generation stock
of about 1,000 GW.
43New capacity is more efficient than older capacity and is profitable to run at higher gas prices than older plants.
When gas prices drop to the point where switching between coal and gas starts to make sense, the new plants will be
the first to be called upon.
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Figure 2.6: Seven-Day Rolling Average of Generation from New Gas-Fired Power Plants
to also be lower.
For emissions reductions estimates, I only look at new capacity added between 2010 and 2013
(25.9 GW). Of this, I estimate roughly 65-85% was induced because of fracking (see Section 2.3).
In Section 2.7 I check the robustness of my primary specification to including daily wind gen-
eration or using additional Newey-West lags.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Decrease in Emissions from Switching
Figure 2.7 shows the relationship between the gas prices and carbon emissions in the Eastern,
Western, and Texas interconnections as estimated using equation 2.2. The vertical lines represent
the knot points in the splines.44
In all three interconnections, the gas price spline is strongly significant. The increase in car-
bon emissions from raising the natural gas price by $1 is highest when natural gas prices are
low because coal and natural gas have similar marginal costs when gas is relatively inexpensive.
Higher price sections of the splines have weaker (or non-existent) effects, as coal is cheaper than
$7/MMBtu gas and it is also cheaper than $12/MMBtu gas. Note that the figures only include
44My primary specification does a very good job of predicting emissions, see Appendix B.3 for details.
55
Figure 2.7: Hourly Relationship between Gas Prices and Carbon Emissions
(a) Eastern: 2:00 AM (Off-Peak) (b) Eastern: 6:00 PM (Peak)
(c) Western: 2:00 AM (Off-Peak) (d) Western: 6:00 PM (Peak)
(e) Texas: 2:00 AM (Off-Peak) (f) Texas: 6:00 PM (Peak)
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the effect of the gas price – fixed effects and other covariates (e.g., electricity demand) have been
stripped out.
The Eastern interconnection has much higher levels of emissions because it is much larger than
the other two interconnections. Additionally, the slope is much steeper at low gas prices because
there is a lot of coal-fired generation that can be replaced in the Eastern interconnection, resulting
in massive emissions savings. In contrast, due in part to their smaller sizes, the Western and Texas
interconnections have less coal-fired generation.
In Figure 2.8, I plot seven-day average (rolling) emissions reductions if gas prices were at 2008
levels. Counterfactual emissions are constructed by taking each day’s control variables as given,
except the gas price is replaced by the gas price from the corresponding date in 2008. For example,
the real price of natural gas on October 9, 2012 was $3.00/MMbtu. On October 9, 2008, the real
price of natural gas was $6.72/MMBtu. In constructing counterfactual emission levels, I keep
renewable production, electricity demand, and fixed effects at the levels on October 9, 2012, but
use $6.72/MMbtu as the gas price.45 I choose 2008 because the gas prices from this year represent
the natural gas market prior to the effect of fracking. Results using 2007 gas prices are qualitatively
and quantitatively similar.
Counterfactual emissions are higher than actual emissions. This is exactly as expected – at
higher gas prices, more coal is being burned. Emissions decreases are greatest in 2012, the year
with the lowest gas prices. Decreases in 2010 are smallest (though still substantial), as this is the
(post-2008) year when gas prices were highest (see Figure 2.3).
Table 2.4 details annual emissions decreases. All years show decreases that are substantial
in magnitude. Depending on price fluctuations within a specific year, annual emissions reductions
caused by low gas prices range between 9.7 and 22.0 thousand tons/hour (row [d]). This is between
3.4% and 7.7% of the 2008 total (s.e. of 0.4%).46 On average, emissions have been 8.2% lower
than 2008, and gas prices were directly responsible for a decrease of 5.0%. Lower gas prices are
responsible for 61% of the total decrease. These decreases are larger in magnitude than has been
previously estimated.
Remember that this estimate does not include possible increases in emissions due to lower
electricity prices (and, consequently, higher electricity quantity demanded). I address what this
demand response might look like in the discussion section. Additionally, the reductions discussed
45I also adjust the interaction term.
46This estimate is a combination of effects in the three interconnections. As such, the standard error is calculated
using block bootstrapping.
57
Figure 2.8: Emissions Reductions due to Lower Gas Prices
(a) Eastern Interconnection (b) Western Interconnection
(c) Texas Interconnection
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Table 2.4: Hourly Reductions in Carbon Dioxide Emissions
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in this subsection are restricted to reductions from switching between gas and coal-fired power
plants. I now address the effect that new capacity had on emissions.
2.6.2 Decrease in Emissions from New Natural Gas Capacity
It is important to control for the exact level of demand (by running an hourly specification) when
new gas-fired capacity is operating. Figure 2.9 illustrates this by showing the relationship between
electricity demand and carbon emissions in all three interconnections at 2:00 AM (off-peak) and
6:00 PM (peak). Marginal emissions can vary based on the level of demand or the hour of genera-
tion.47
The difference in the demand splines is subtle in the Eastern interconnection (panels (a) and
(b)). The 2:00 AM spline is a little steeper than the 6:00 PM spline. This is likely because coal-
fired generation is more frequently used to meet marginal demand during off-peak hours than
during peak hours.
The importance of using a demand spline is most visible in the Western interconnection (panels
(c) and (d)). When demand is around 50,000 MW, incremental demand causes very low incremen-
tal emissions (panel (c)). However, marginal emissions are higher at demand levels above 60,000
MW. This is largely because, in the Western interconnection, the marginal fuel switches from re-
newable hydro-electric generation to gas-fired generation as demand increases from very low levels
to more moderate levels.
The Texas interconnection (panels (e) and (f)) shows the least variation in marginal emissions
across hours and demand-levels, though the demand splines have some non-linearities. The major-
ity of marginal generation is met by gas-fired plants, and changing marginal emissions are likely
due to differences in generator efficiency. In particular, there is a slight increase in the slope of the
demand spline when demand increases from low to moderate levels – levels when less-efficient
gas-fired plants are running.
Figure 2.10 graphs seven-day rolling emissions reductions due to new gas-fired plant construc-
tion. Due to the lead time required to build a new gas-fired power plant, I only consider emissions
reductions from plants that came online in 2010 or later. Strikingly, reductions are concentrated in
the Eastern interconnection. This is largely true because the Eastern interconnection is the largest
and has the most new plants. In 2012, the Eastern interconnection averaged 8.5 GW of generation
at any time from new plants, while the other two interconnections each generated about 1 GW. Ad-
ditionally, marginal emissions from incremental demand are higher in the Eastern interconnection
47Figure 2.9 does not incorporate the “high gas price demand spline.”
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Figure 2.9: Hourly Relationship between Electricity Demand and Carbon Emissions
(a) Eastern: 2:00 AM (Off-Peak) (b) Eastern: 6:00 PM (Peak)
(c) Western: 2:00 AM (Off-Peak) (d) Western: 6:00 PM (Peak)
(e) Texas: 2:00 AM (Off-Peak) (f) Texas: 6:00 PM (Peak)
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Figure 2.10: Seven-Day Rolling Emissions Reductions due to New Construction
(a) Eastern Interconnection (b) Western Interconnection
(c) Texas Interconnection
because it is more reliant on coal-fired generation. New gas-fired generation in the Eastern inter-
connection is more likely to offset coal-fired generation, and corresponding emissions reductions
will be larger in the Eastern interconnection.
Note that this was not a foregone conclusion. It could have been the case that the new gas-fired
power plants were not running very frequently or were replacing similar gas-fired power plants.
This could have led to no net emissions reductions. Additionally, Figure 2.10 shows several places
where counterfactual emissions are actually lower than actual emissions.48
48In particular, the WECC shows some emissions increases at the end of 2013. In contrast to the other intercon-
nections, most of the new plants in the WECC are single-cycle “peakers” that have low capital costs, but are not very
efficient. When combined with the fact that marginal emissions are lowest in the WECC, emissions increases are
possible. The magnitude of these increases is very small.
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Table 2.4 details annual emissions decreases from newly constructed capacity (see row [f]). As
expected, continued additions over time cause emissions reductions to grow over time. By 2013,
hourly emissions savings averaged 2.1 thousand tons. This is 0.75% of the 2008 total. As detailed
in section 2.3, I estimate about 65-85% of the 2.1 thousand tons/hour is directly attributable to
lower gas prices. Because the capital stock is brand new, these gains will likely persist for years.
The reduction in emissions due to construction of new plants is less dependent upon low gas
prices. Many new gas-fired power plants are very efficient. They fall below some coal plants in the
dispatch order even when gas prices are moderate. Their combined-cycle technology can achieve
efficiency of around 50%. In contrast, older plants are more likely to use single-cycle technology
that only allows for efficiency around 33%.
2012 was warmer than average, which led to gas prices that are lower than average – and
also lower than in 2013. Despite this, emissions reductions from newly constructed power plants
continued to grow; 2013 emissions reductions were actually larger than those in 2012. A return to
pre-fracking gas prices would be unlikely to negate all of the emissions gains from the new capital
stock that has been built.
2.6.3 Combined Decrease in Emissions from Low Gas Prices and New Natural Gas
Capacity
I now consider the combined effect of lower gas prices and new natural gas capacity. Specifically,
I use my primary specification and adjust both the gas price to 2008 levels and electricity demand
up as in the previous two sections (and make corresponding changes to the interaction term).
There are primarily two countervailing effects that determine how the interaction of low gas
prices with new construction will affect carbon emissions. Lower gas prices, when combined with
new plant construction, mean that it is likely new plants will run more frequently than they would if
gas prices remained at higher levels. This would suggest that the combined effect should be larger.
Working against this is that both changes, individually, might end up causing the same adjustments
to the dispatch curve. That is, e.g., building a new gas-fired plant would cause it to displace a
certain coal plant. If, instead, gas prices were lower, an existing plant might also displace the same
coal plant. However, it is clear that one coal plant can only be displaced once. This would suggest
that the combined effect should be smaller. However, it is possible that more than one coal plant is
able to be displaced, allowing for positive synergies.
If I combine these changes and estimate a counterfactual where gas prices are at 2008 levels
and no new gas-fired capacity was constructed, 2013 hourly emissions become 269.4 thousand tons
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of carbon/hour. This is close to 2008’s levels of 284.7 thousand tons of carbon/hour. Gas prices
and new gas fired capacity are responsible for a reduction of 16.7 thousand tons of carbon/hour
(s.e. of 0.9). This is a substantial decrease of 5.9% from 2008 levels. Table 2.4 again details these
changes by year (row [h]).
The combined effect of these two changes is slightly less than the sum of its parts. In 2013,
lower gas prices reduced emissions by 14.7 thousand tons of carbon/hour, while newly constructed
capacity reduced emissions by 2.1 thousand tons of carbon/hour. However, total reductions of 16.7
thousand tons of carbon/hour are 0.2 thousand tons/hour less than the 16.9 thousand tons/hour that
are the sum of the parts. This suggests that potential synergies are outweighed by the inability to
displace the same dirty plant twice. Note that this effect is relatively small.
2.7 Robustness Checks
I consider several alternative specifications to alleviate concerns about my results being due to
misspecification or chance. In this section I focus on including daily wind generation and using
additional Newey-West lags. In Appendices B.4 and B.5 I consider using alternative gas prices or
a gas/coal price ratio.
2.7.1 Inclusion of Daily Wind Generation Data
It is possible that failing to control for wind causes my results to be overstated. This could be the
case because windy days decrease both carbon emissions and the gas price. As more wind power is
generated, less fossil-fuel generation is needed. As a result, carbon emissions will drop, as will the
prices of fossil fuels. Daily wind generation is only available in the Texas interconnection. Texas
has the most wind capacity as a percentage of electricity demand (the Western interconnection has
about two-thirds as much and the Eastern interconnection has about one-third as much). Thus, any
effects of wind generation should be smaller in the other two interconnections.
Specifically, I estimate the following regression49:
TEt = α0 + s(P
NG
t ) + s(Q
E
t ) + 1{PNGt > med(PNGt )} ∗ s(QEt ) + s(Renewablest)
+ s(Datet) + γDm + s(Windt) + εt (2.3)
49I also include two dummies to account for data irregularities. Most of the data is from a colleague, while about
2% is directly from ERCOT. Additionally, approximately 2% of the data remains missing. I fill missing data with the
observation from 24 hours prior to preserve the structure of the dataset.
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The resulting splines and counterfactual emissions reductions are similar. Figure 2.11 shows
two splines that are comparable to those in Figure 2.7. There are almost no differences between
the two figures. This translates into limited change in the estimates. For example, my primary
specification estimates that Texas carbon emissions in 2013 were 1.46 thousand tons/hour lower
than they would have been with higher gas prices (s.e. of 0.21). By including wind in my specifi-
cation, this estimate actually increases to 1.64 thousand tons/hour (s.e. of 0.20). I interpret these
estimates as essentially the same. This suggests that the estimates presented in this paper do not
have a large bias due to the failure to include daily wind generation. Any potential bias would be
mitigated in the (larger) Eastern and Western interconnections by the fact that wind generation is a
substantially smaller portion of the generation portfolio.
Figure 2.11: Texas Interconnection Gas Price Splines Including Wind Generation
(a) Texas: 2:00 AM (Off-Peak) (b) Texas: 6:00 PM (Peak)
2.7.2 Additional Autocorrelation Lags
I now consider how the standard errors would change if I allowed for additional periods of auto-
correlation. While my preferred specification allows for one week of autocorrelation, this section
allows for one month of autocorrelation. For estimates that are composites of multiple regions or
multiple hours, this means that I use larger blocks in my block bootstrap.
Table 2.4 displays estimates using seven days of autocorrelation. For example, my combined
estimate for 2013 of 16.7 thousand tons of carbon/hour has a standard error of 0.9. Increasing the
allowed autocorrelation to one month increases the standard error to 1.4. The estimate of reductions
caused by new plants is 2.1 thousand tons of carbon/hour, with a standard error of 0.062. Using




2.8.1 Estimated Value of Offset Emissions
I now estimate the economic value of reduced emissions. This is important because it allows one to
better understand the magnitude of the benefits. The US Government recently provided an updated
estimate of the social cost of carbon; it is currently about $35/ton (Interagency Working Group on
Social Cost of Carbon, 2013). I estimate that lower gas prices offset about 14,700 tons/hour of
carbon emissions in 2013. At current valuations, this is worth about (365 * 24 * 14,700 * 35 = )
$4.5 billion. In 2013, newly constructed gas-fired power plants reduced carbon emissions by about
2,100 tons/hour. This is worth about (365 * 24 * 2,100 * 35 = ) $0.65 billion. My estimates from
Section 2.3 suggest that between $0.43 and $0.56 billion of the $0.65 billion (65-85%) is due to
fracking. Combined, I estimate the 2013 decrease in carbon emissions is worth about $5.1 billion.
Most of this benefit is a pure externality, as the market only prices carbon in the RGGI states and,
starting in 2013, California.50
The value of the emissions reductions varies between 2009 and 2013. The least valuable year
was 2010, with offsets worth about (365 * 24 * 9,700 * 35 = ) $3.0 billion. The most valuable year
was 2012, with offsets worth about (365 * 24 * 23,700 * 35 = ) $7.3 billion.
2.8.2 Demand Response
It is important to recognize that additional electricity demand and emissions may have been in-
duced by lower gas prices (which led to lower electricity prices). Indeed, Linn, Muehlenbachs and
Wang (2014) find that natural gas and electricity prices have a positive and causal relationship.
Estimating the demand response to lower electricity prices is difficult. In 2008, average electricity
prices were 10.32 cents/kilowatt-hour, with 7.07 cents/kilowatt-hour coming from generation. The
2008 AEO projected that the average electricity price in 2013 would be 0.45 cents/kilowatt-hour
lower, with a 0.61 cents/kilowatt-hour decrease in generation costs (transmission and distribution
costs were projected to rise). This projection was made prior to information about the decline
in gas prices. In reality, electricity prices fell by 0.53 cents to 9.79 cents/kilowatt-hour in 2013.
Generation costs fell by 1.28 cents/kilowatt-hour. That is, electricity prices fell by (0.53 - 0.45 =
50For comparison, I use EIA data to estimate that generation, transmission, and distribution costs decreased by
between $3 and $27 billion because of lower gas prices. My estimation methodology is analogous to the way I
estimate potential demand response in the following section.
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) 0.08 cents/kilowatt-hour more than expected, and generation costs fell by (1.28 - 0.61 = ) 0.66
cents/kilowatt-hour more than expected.
Determining whether the 0.08 cents/kilowatt-hour or the 0.66 cents/kilowatt-hour number is
appropriate to ascribe to lower gas prices is also challenging.51 The difference is due to increased
transmission and distribution costs, some of which could have resulted from changing generation
patterns. I will use these as the bounds of the potential demand response. A decline of 0.08
cents/kilowatt-hour is equivalent to a decrease of 0.78%, while a decline of 0.66 cents/kilowatt-
hour is equivalent to 6.44%.
Using an elasticity of -0.3, these estimates suggest that electricity demand has increased by
between 0.23% and 1.93%. I can now use my primary specification (2.2) to estimate the rebound
effect. For the lower bound in 2013, I estimate lower electricity prices prompt increases in demand
that cause carbon emissions to increase by 0.6 thousand tons/hour (s.e. of 0.005). For the upper
bound, I estimate carbon emissions increase by 5.2 thousand tons/hour (s.e. of 0.04). This is
between 4% and 36% of the estimated 14.7 thousand tons/hour of emissions decreases caused by
lower gas prices.52
2.8.3 Other Environmental Considerations
Even considering potential demand response, it is clear that new gas supplies have decreased car-
bon emissions in the electricity sector. However, it is also the case that drilling for natural gas can
have deleterious effects on the environment. In particular, if drillers are careless, leaking methane
can offset many of the carbon emissions gains. President Obama’s recently announced methane
regulations demonstrate that this is being taken seriously by the federal government. The extent
to which methane leaks are eliminated will largely determine whether or not fracking has a net
positive effect on American greenhouse gas emissions. For a meta-analysis and overview of the
shale gas life-cycle greenhouse gas emissions literature, see Heath et al. (2014).
2.9 Conclusion
Instead of declining, as projected several years ago, US natural gas production has dramatically in-
creased over the last five years. This happened in part because the federal government has allowed
it to. Governments (excluding New York’s) have largely refrained from imposing regulations that
51This analysis assumes that consumers respond to average prices as Ito (2014) demonstrates. I use 2012 prices for
these estimates.
52To the extent that other factors changed, such as increased Chinese demand for coal, these bounds may prove to
be insufficiently narrow.
67
would seriously curb hydraulic fracturing for natural gas. I estimate that, depending on the year,
2009-2013 electric sector carbon emissions have decreased by between 3.4% and 8.3% as a result
of lower gas prices. Lower gas prices have likely been a moderate contributor to the decrease in
American carbon emissions over the last five years.
In many industries, capital stock is an important determinant of capability. It evolves slowly
over time, even when large shifts have occurred within a sector. Investments in natural gas capacity
will likely continue, so long as natural gas prices remain low. Recent government regulations
intended to cut carbon make coal power plants even less desirable, increasing the amount of natural
gas-fired capacity to be added in the near future. These plants will be with us for many years.
Similarly, investments that were made decades ago in telecommunications, mass transportation,
sewer lines, and interstates remain in regular use today, often way past their life expectancy.
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Chapter 3
Airline Competition, Oil Price Pass-Through,
and Carbon Taxes
(With Anirudh Jayanti and Andrew Usher)
3.1 Introduction
Cost pass-through – the rate at which a cost change translates to a price change – is an impor-
tant concept in many areas of economics, ranging from industrial organization (e.g., the effect of
a merger) to international trade (e.g., exchange rate pass-through) and public finance (e.g., tax
incidence). In particular, energy cost pass-through has important implications for environmental
policy. In this paper, we use the Australian airline industry to study how fuel cost shocks are
passed through to airfares and how the pass-through rate depends on the competitiveness of the
route. Airlines are an intriguing setting to study pass-through due to the presence of many local
“markets” (i.e. routes) existing simultaneously. Furthermore, from a policy standpoint, the airline
industry is a significant emitter of carbon dioxide and is therefore an important part of the debate
on strategies to address global climate change.
Fuel costs make up a significant portion of airlines’ total costs and could potentially be passed
on to consumers in the form of higher airfares. Additionally, the level of competition on a route
likely affects how much of the cost is passed on. Pass-through in this context is important because
the effect of higher fuel costs should be equivalent to the effect of a carbon tax (Cullen and Mansur,
2014). The pass-through rate we find could then help policymakers evaluate the likely effects of a
carbon tax on the airline industry. Finally, by evaluating how pass-through differs with the number
of competitors on a route and the type of product, we can shed light on the nature of competition
in this industry.
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This paper uses a novel dataset consisting of Australian airfare data from Sabre Corporation
and capacity data from the Official Airline Guide (OAG). The airfare data is monthly, an important
advantage over the publicly available, quarterly Databank 1B US data. The capacity data tells us
exactly which aircraft each carrier used on each of its routes; we use this to construct a measure
of fuel costs that is specific to each carrier and route. Our main empirical finding is that the pass-
through rate is very high – around 100% for monopoly routes – and increases with additional
competitors.
This paper has two main contributions. First, we estimate fuel cost pass-through in an indus-
try characterized by differentiated products and imperfect competition. Because each firm offers
multiple products (e.g. non-stop vs. one-stop flights), there is potential for pass-through to be
different across products within the same firm. In fact, we should expect this to be the case due to
different demand elasticities for different products. Relative to homogeneous-product industries,
firms’ ability to discriminate in this way could, for example, improve welfare by passing more of
the cost on to relatively inelastic consumers. Because only the inelastic consumers are faced with
a higher price, quantity supplied will be distorted less than if firms were unable to discriminate.
These issues have been understudied in the empirical pass-through literature.
Second, we evaluate the heterogeneity of pass-through across different routes. We study how
the pass-through rate varies by how competitive the route is. Theoretically, the relationship could
go either way. A simple model of linear demand and constant marginal cost tells us that pass-
through is 100% in perfect competition and 50% for a monopolist. If we further assume symmetric
Cournot competition for the oligopoly case, pass-through rises monotonically from the monopoly
rate to the perfectly competitive rate as the number of firms grows. On the other hand, other
demand forms such as CES can have pass-through that is greater than 100% and decreasing with
competition. This is therefore an empirical question. We find that pass-through increases with
competition in the airline industry.
In answering these questions, our paper contributes to several literatures. A large literature in
industrial organization studies market structure in the airline industry (Borenstein (1989); Berry
(1992); Goolsbee and Syverson (2008); Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)). These papers estimate the
impact of market dominance, entry, and the threat of entry. Another strand of this literature con-
siders welfare effects of shorter-run decisions such as pricing, capacity, and codeshare agreements
(Berry and Jia (2010); Armantier and Richard (2008)). Finally, there is a large literature that
studies how price discrimination varies with competition in the airline industry (Borenstein and
Rose (1994); Gerardi and Shapiro (2009); Chandra and Lederman (2015)). None of these papers
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consider fuel cost pass-through.
There has recently been renewed theoretical and empirical interest in pass-through. Weyl and
Fabinger (2013) theoretically characterize several principles of pass-through under different mar-
ket structures. Their main finding in general cases of imperfect competition is that pass-through
depends crucially on the curvature of demand. Our reduced-form analysis imposes little structure
on the curvature of demand, so we are not pre-determining pass-through with restrictive functional
form assumptions. Unfortunately, this also means we cannot formally say anything about welfare,
since in the Weyl and Fabinger (2013) framework this depends on both pass-through and a conduct
parameter.
On the empirical side, Agrawal, White and Williams (2017) use Weyl and Fabinger (2013)’s
framework to estimate tax incidence and competition in the US airline industry. Fabra and Reguant
(2014), Miller, Osborne and Sheu (2017), and Ganapati, Shapiro and Walker (2016) study energy
cost pass-through in homogeneous product industries (electricity, cement, and a subset of manu-
facturing, respectively). All three studies find high rates. Ganapati, Shapiro and Walker (2016)
find a pass-through rate of 70% for manufacturing. Fabra and Reguant (2014) find that over 80%
of emissions cost shocks are passed on to electricity prices. Miller, Osborne and Sheu (2017) find
that fuel costs are more than fully passed on to cement prices.
Some studies have examined the relationship between pass-through and competition. Miller,
Osborne and Sheu (2017) find that competition reduces pass-through in the cement industry. They
explain this result using a symmetric oligopoly model with log-convex demand based on Weyl and
Fabinger (2013). Ganapati, Shapiro and Walker (2016) compare several manufacturing industries
and find that pass-through appears to be greatest in the least-competitive industry they study. On the
other hand, Cabral, Geruso and Mahoney (2014) find that pass-through increases with competition
in the Medicare Advantage insurance market. Given that different studies have found different
results, the relationship between pass-through and competition is an empirical question. We use
simulations and specific features of the airline industry to explain our finding that pass-through
increases with competition.
Pass-through has also been studied extensively in contexts other than energy. In the interna-
tional trade literature, Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013) estimate a structural model of the beer
industry to explain incomplete exchange-rate pass through. This paper studies a differentiated
product industry, but only in a single market (Chicago), whereas our setting allows us to look at
heterogeneity across markets.
A separate literature at the intersection of industrial organization and environmental economics
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finds that the welfare effects of environmental regulation can be quite different in imperfectly
competitive markets (Ryan (2012); Fowlie, Reguant and Ryan (2016)). These papers consider
the cement industry; by contrast, we study the airline industry which is also a major source of
emissions that are projected to grow rapidly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide background on the
Australian airline industry. In Section 3.3, we describe our data. Section 3.4 discusses the empirical
model. Section 3.5 presents our main results, as well as a series of robustness checks. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Background: Australian Airline Industry
This paper focuses on the domestic Australian air market. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of
Australia’s major airports. Australia is a particularly nice setting for our study because it is a
relatively isolated country, decreasing the potential for outside events to substantially influence it.1
Flying is the obvious way to travel between many of Australia’s cities due to the lack of viable
alternative transportation options. Many highways do not have frequent rest stops like those in the
United States, and the rail network is much less developed than Europe’s. Additionally, airline
data are available at a higher frequency than similar publicly-available US data. Finally, Australia
passed and repealed a carbon tax during our sample period. This policy change provides us with
some additional variation and confirms that our results are relevant in the context of a carbon tax.
Australia’s air market has two major full-service airlines – Qantas and Virgin – as well as a
set of regional competitors and low-cost airlines. The regional and low-cost airlines have varying
degrees of independence from the full-service airlines. While some operate fully independently,
others have been purchased by Qantas or Virgin and become wholly-owned subsidiaries and/or are
members of the same airline alliance. The latter relationship allows cross-marketing across each
other’s flights.2 Table 3.1 shows each major airline’s market share during our sample period.
Jet fuel is one of airlines’ main costs and can constitute up to 30% of total costs. Jet fuel is a
refined product that is made from crude oil. Consequently, its price is closely tied to the price of
crude oil. The ease of transporting oil and its products means that prices are determined in world
markets. World oil markets are very thick and no individual participant can substantially affect
prices. We therefore treat jet fuel as an exogenous cost that airlines have no control over.
1For example, air travelers in the Netherlands have outside options at Dusseldorf Airport (Germany) and Brussels
Airport (Belgium).
2For example, one could purchase from Qantas a flight that is operated by Northern Air Cargo.
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Figure 3.1: Map of Australian Airports
Notes: Reprinted with permission from IA Connections. The original map is available at http:
//www.sydney-australia.biz/maps/australia/australiaairportsmap.
php. Some small airports are not pictured, though they are present within our data.
Australia introduced carbon tax legislation in 2011. The legislation was subsequently passed
and took effect on July 1, 2012. It was later repealed on July 17, 2014, but the repeal was backdated
to July 1, 2014. We will treat July 1, 2012 through July 1, 2014 as months that airlines were
expecting to pay the carbon tax. While most industries paid a tax of just under $25AUD/ton, jet
fuel was taxed at 6 Australian cents per liter. This tax was equivalent to roughly $21.50/ton of
carbon.3
Airlines have two primary ways to respond to changing jet fuel costs. Adjusting airfares is the
easiest and most flexible way that airlines adapt – many airfares are changed multiple times per
week. Airlines can also alter the set of routes that they offer, as well as the frequency with which
each route is offered. However, this adjustment process generally takes considerably longer; it is
3This is within the range of estimates of the social cost of carbon, albeit at the lower end.
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Notes: There are ten different airlines that operate with some degree of independence during our
sample. Qantas and Virgin are the major full-service airlines. Jetstar is a low-cost wholly-owned
subsidiary of Qantas. It competes with Qantas on many routes. Tiger was an independent low-cost
airline until 2013 when Virgin purchased 60% of the airline. Virgin purchased the remaining 40%
in 2014. The other six airlines are regional players that focus on less-serviced routes.
relatively expensive for airlines to adjust flights that they have already sold tickets for. We therefore
focus on airlines’ price responses to changing fuel costs.
3.3 Data Description & Summary Statistics
Our airline price and passenger data was purchased from Sabre Corporation. It consists of detailed
monthly level data for all domestic air travel in Australia from 2010 through 2015.4 The raw data
is aggregated so that everybody who flew on a given airline during a given month for an exact
one-way itinerary in a cabin class is combined. For example, all passengers who flew discount
economy on Qantas from Sydney to Perth via Canberra in January 2010 is one observation. For
each observation, we see the number of passengers and total revenue in the month traveled rather
than the month purchased (we explain below how we handle this constraint). The full sample
consists of many routes with inconvenient layovers and very few passengers. Consequently, we
drop observations where the airline has less than 1% market share for a route. These dropped
observations are likely not viable competitors for most passengers. Total fare data is inclusive of
all taxes, fees, and surcharges.
4Having the universe of tickets vs. a subsample is another advantage of our data over the DB1B.
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Airline capacity and aircraft data was purchased from OAG. It contains the complete schedule
of all domestic flights within Australia during our time period. We have data on the frequency,
time, aircraft, and number of seats available for each route. Figure 3.2 shows capacity in terms of
thousands of seats per day for the four largest carriers.
Figure 3.2: Seat Capacities by Airlines
We construct the average cost of jet fuel (P JFirt ) for each carrier-route-month observation by
multiplying three terms together,
P JFirt = P
Barrel
t ∗Distr ∗ FuelEffirt (3.1)
the average price of a barrel of jet fuel (PBarrelt ) in month t, carrier i’s average fuel efficiency for
a route (FuelEffirt) in month t on route r, and distance (Distr) on route r. The average cost
of jet fuel (P JFirt ) varies with all three terms; different aircraft can have large differences in fuel
efficiency, longer routes require more fuel than shorter routes, and the price of jet fuel varies over
our time period. We now briefly discuss the source and construction of each term.
We collect daily jet fuel price data (PBarrelt ) from Platts (accessed via Bloomberg) at the US
Gulf Coast and average it by month. Because we do not know the date each ticket is sold, we
assume that the average ticket is purchased one month in advance and lag our fuel prices by one
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month.5 As discussed above, because oil is traded on global markets, we assume that the Gulf
Coast price is a good proxy for the price Australian airlines face.6 Jet fuel prices ranged between
45 and 163 US cents per liter during our sample period. Figure 3.3 plots average airfares and jet
fuel prices. Both series are de-trended by year (to account for macro trends) and month (to account
for seasonality). Total airfare tracks jet fuel closely for most of the sample.
Figure 3.3: Airfares and Jet Fuel Prices
Notes: Airfares are averages across Australia for a given month. Jet fuel prices are from the US
Gulf Coast.
Distance (Distr) is one of the variables provided in our data from Sabre Corporation. Distance
varies across and within routes – one-stop and non-stop itineraries will have different distances –
and is an important source of fuel cost variation. Figure 3.4 provides a graphical representation
of the variation from distance. The y-axis denotes the residual from a regression of jet fuel costs
on month-of-sample fixed effects, while the x-axis shows each observation’s distance. Distance is
positively and meaningfully correlated with our fuel cost estimates.
Finally, for each observation we assign an average fuel efficiency (FuelEffirt) based on the
5Our results are robust to varying the advance purchase assumption. See Table C.2 in Appendix C.1.
6Additionally, using Gulf Coast prices is advantageous because these prices are heavily correlated with Australian
prices but not with Australia-specific demand shocks.
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Figure 3.4: Jet Fuel Costs and Distances
Notes: This is a scatterplot of estimated jet fuel cost residuals and itinerary distances. Residuals
are calculated after regressing jet fuel costs on month-of-sample fixed effects. The orange line is a
line of best fit and demonstrates that the residuals are positively correlated with itinerary distance.
Distance is positively and meaningfully correlated with our fuel cost estimates.
aircraft flying that route. Fuel efficiency data for each aircraft are gathered from internet research.7
Fuel economy data varies widely by type of aircraft. Generally, larger aircraft use less fuel per
seat-mile. Additionally, there can be large differences within aircraft class. For example, the 98-
seat Embraer E-Jet-190 uses 3.81 L/100km/seat while the 82-seat Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 uses
2.79 L/100km/seat.
Table 3.2 summarizes our data at a slightly aggregated level: we combine passengers with
different intermediate stops and passengers in different cabin classes. An observation is at the
month-airline-route level (e.g., all seats on Qantas-operated flights from Sydney to Melbourne in
January 2012, including routes with stops).
Recall from the discussion in Section 3.2 that the two dominant airlines – Qantas and Virgin
– partly or wholly own regional airlines. In particular, Jetstar is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Qantas for the entire sample period. Consequently, we code any Jetstar flight as being operated by
7Wikipedia aggregates and cites estimates for many aircraft. Additional data is gathered for aircraft not listed there.
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Table 3.2: Air Travel Summary Statistics
Full Sample Non-Stop Flights
mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
Passengers 2760.32 10422.70 4466.20 11153.81
Average Total Fare (USD) 347.47 195.38 224.15 96.50
Average Fuel Cost (USD) 36.78 30.02 20.39 30.07
Distance (’000 KM) 1.79 1.43 0.87 1.28
Average Capacity Factor 0.69 0.12 0.70 0.16
Jet Fuel Price (US Cents/Liter) 113.46 26.22 113.34 26.07
Notes: Observations are at the month-route-airline level in the left two columns. For example,
one observation is all passengers that flew from Sydney to Melbourne in January 2010 on Qantas.
There are 112,965 total observations. The right two columns exclude data that has more than one
stop.
Qantas; we do not want to label Jetstar as a competitor for Qantas because Qantas likely internalizes
the profit impacts of Jetstar’s pricing. Similarly, Tiger Airways was fully owned by Virgin after
October 2012; we therefore code any Tiger Airways flight after that date as being operated by
Virgin.
Code-sharing is common in Australia, as it is in the United States. For the purposes of esti-
mating pass-through, we are interested in the identity of the operating (rather than the marketing)
airline because the operating airline is the one that makes pricing decisions. Therefore, we calcu-




Our empirical strategy seeks to estimate the degree to which competition affects jet fuel pass-
through in airfares. We estimate various forms of equation 3.2 below. Our dependent variable
(Airfareirt) is the weighted (by passengers) average airfare for a given origin-destination (r),
airline (i), and month(t).8 For example, one observation in this specification is the weighted average
of airfares for all itineraries that traveled from Sydney to Melbourne on Qantas during January
2010. This means that we aggregate across cabin classes and different itineraries (for example,
8Origin-destination pairs are directional, i.e. Sydney–Melbourne is a different route than Melbourne–Sydney.
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non-stop itineraries and itineraries that have a stop in Canberra).
Airfareirt = α + β1Compsrt + β2P
JF
irt + β3Compsrt × P JFirt + ωQt + δMt + Xrt + εirt (3.2)
On the right-hand side, we have the average cost of jet fuel for each origin-destination-airline-
month observation (P JFirt ), the number of competitors on a route (Compsrt), and the interaction of
these two terms. Construction of the jet fuel price variable is discussed in Section 3.3. The number
of competitors is calculated by counting the number of airlines that have at least 1% market share
and fly between the origin and destination, regardless of the number of stops.
We expect β1 to be negative and β2 and β3 to be positive. Our coefficients of interest are β2 and
β3. The average pass-through rate on a given route can be calculated as β2 + β3 × Compsrt.
3.4.2 Identification
Because airlines typically sign long-term contracts with airports for gate access, and air schedules
are set far in advance, we assume that the number of competitors on a route is fixed in the short run.
While the number of competitors may be endogenous, it will not vary endogenously with the price
of jet fuel – it takes time for an airline to change their route schedule and to enter new markets.
The price of jet fuel is determined in a world market and will not be affected by Australian
firms’ decisions. However, unobserved macroeconomic demand shocks could make the price of
jet fuel endogenous; if demand shocks increase both the demand for air travel and the price of jet
fuel, our estimate of the pass-through rate would be biased upwards. To control for unobserved
macroeconomic shocks, we include quarter-of-sample (Qt) fixed effects. Demand for air travel is
also highly seasonal (e.g. during the summer and holidays), so we include calendar month (Mt)
fixed effects.9
Some specifications include a set of state- and route-specific controls (Xrt). We construct the
geometric mean of the origin and destination’s local government area (LGA) populations, den-
sities, and building values.10 We also use the average of the origin and destination LGA’s net
migration. We use the geometric mean of origin and destination states’ population, wages, busi-
ness expenditures, mineral exploration, and petroleum exploration.11 These controls will address
9We also include the monthly national unemployment rate as a more fine-grained control in some specifications.
10An Australian LGA is roughly equivalent to a US MSA.
11The geometric mean is better than the arithmetic mean at capturing variation when locations have very different
values. For example, consider how the arithmetic and geometric means differ for: a city of one million people and a
town of ten thousand vs. a city of one million and a town of twenty thousand. The arithmetic means will be nearly
identical, while the geometric means will be further apart. For airline demand, the latter is likely more informative.
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route-specific demand and cost shifts.12 In most specifications, we also use each flight’s capacity
factor as a control. This is constructed simply as the total number of passengers on a route divided
by the total number of seats (for multi-stop itineraries, each leg’s capacity factor is weighted by the
miles traveled on that leg). We include origin and destination fixed effects and route fixed effects
in some specifications. In the most restrictive specifications with route fixed effects, identification
of our parameters of interest comes from shocks to jet fuel prices and entry and exit within routes.
This is similar to the identification strategy used by Miller, Osborne and Sheu (2017).
Our analyses are weighted by the number of passengers flying each route. We take this ap-
proach because we are primarily interested in the major routes. Flights on small planes that only
run once a week are a small part of carbon emissions and may not be broadly representative. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the monthly level.
3.5 Results
Table 3.3 presents our first set of primary results. The second row reports the pass-through rate
for a monopoly route, while the third row reports how the pass-through rate varies with additional
competitors. Our preferred specification is in the last column, which includes the most restrictive
sets of controls and fixed effects. The estimates suggest that pass-through in the presence of a
monopoly is roughly 110%, with each additional competitor increasing pass-through by 25%.
These estimates are relatively stable across the last four columns.13
Our finding of pass-through rates above 100% could be an artifact of how we calculate jet
fuel costs. Because passengers are a very small amount of the weight on most jets, their marginal
contribution to jet fuel costs is small. To calculate the per person jet fuel cost, we take the total
jet fuel cost and spread it across the total number of seats. However, many flights in Australia are
not flown at capacity. If a plane flies at half capacity, a 100% pass-through rate implies that the
airline is only recovering 50% of the marginal fuel costs. Future work will more fully explore the
pass-through implications of unfilled seats.
Table 3.4 presents coefficients when our data have been disaggregated by the number of stops.14
We use the arithmetic mean for net migration because net migration can be negative, invalidating the geometric mean.
12Some states in Australia experienced a resource boom during our sample period, which is why we control for
mineral and petroleum exploration.
13Appendix Table C.1 runs a similar set of regressions to those in Table 3.3, but it allows for non-linear responses
to competition. The coefficients are similar to those from the linear specification. Coefficients on routes that have five
competitors are not in line with the rest of the results. However, there are only 60 observations with 5 competitors. We
consider those coefficients anomalous.
14This means that we have separate observations for all non-stop, one-stop, two-stop, and three-stop flights for a
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These coefficients are very similar to our primary results in Table 3.3. Though our point estimates
in the last four columns are centered at values below one, the standard errors are large enough
that we cannot reject a pass-through rate of one. Furthermore, at the mean level of competition
in our sample – one competitor – the sum of the pass-through and interaction coefficients pushes
pass-through above one. This suggests that our results in Table 3.3 are not simply due to how we
aggregated the data.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 report results for only non-stop and one-stop flights, respectively.15 These
are differentiated products and we might expect pass-through to vary between them. Indeed, pass-
through on non-stop flights is 67% for a monopoly, with a 33% premium for each additional com-
petitor. For one-stop flights, however, pass-through is 150% with virtually no additional changes
due to the number of competitors. Even with one or two competitors, pass-through is lower on
non-stop flights. One interpretation of these results is that passengers on non-stop flights are more
price-elastic than passengers on one-stop flights. This seems unintuitive since non-stop flights are
generally more expensive, but certain models of demand (e.g., logit) imply that elasticity increases
with price. Another interpretation is that passengers on one-stop flights are low-value types whose
price airlines will distort more in order to respect the high-value non-stop passengers’ incentive
compatibility constraints. Future structural work on pass-through and price discrimination will
look to disentangle these competing explanations.
Table 3.7 includes a jet fuel cost and capacity factor interaction term. Our results show that
pass-through is very sensitive to how full planes are. Routes with higher capacity factors have
higher pass-through rates.
Finally, Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show how pass-through varies for economy and business class seats.
Results suggest that business class pass-through is lower and may be less responsive to competition
than economy class pass-through.16 This matches common intuition about business travelers being
less elastic (however, the coefficients are not always statistically different from each other). Future
work will more formally discuss the effects of price discrimination through different implements
(e.g. non-stop vs. one-stop flights, cabin class, etc.), and their implications for pass-through.
given route-carrier-month.
15We drop distance controls from the non-stop regression with route fixed effects as these will be collinear.
16In the business class regressions, we define competitors as those carriers who also offer business class seats on the
same route.
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Table 3.3: Regression Results: Baseline
Weighted by Number of Passengers
No Fixed Effects Mileage O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls Route FE
Number of Competitors -42.263∗∗∗ -23.968∗∗∗ -6.861∗∗∗ -7.467∗∗∗ -9.302∗∗∗ -4.268∗
(2.114) (1.795) (1.918) (1.751) (1.696) (2.320)
Jet Fuel Cost 2.038∗∗∗ 3.181∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 1.139∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗ 1.102∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.295) (0.181) (0.167) (0.173) (0.190)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 1.908∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.093) (0.061) (0.055) (0.053) (0.072)
Capacity Factor -91.101∗∗∗ 43.272∗∗∗ 41.592∗∗∗ 28.067∗∗∗ 57.264∗∗∗
(14.229) (6.631) (8.746) (8.716) (8.726)
Thousand KM, Avg 33.291∗∗∗ 72.203∗∗∗ 59.391∗∗∗ 75.144∗∗∗ 83.478∗∗∗
(4.390) (3.435) (3.082) (3.578) (11.089)
Distance Squared -6.536∗∗∗ -1.373∗∗ -1.339∗∗ -2.617∗∗∗ -12.834∗∗∗
(0.326) (0.573) (0.521) (0.493) (2.108)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Num Stops Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R squared 0.495 0.537 0.768 0.784 0.790 0.833
Observations 112965 112965 112965 112965 102297 102168
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination level.
For example, one observation is all passengers traveling from Sydney to Melbourne on Qantas
in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least 1% market share is
required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors are clustered at
the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights are assigned according to the
number of passengers in an observation.
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Table 3.4: Regression Results: Observations Separated by Number of Stops
Weighted by Number of Passengers
No Fixed Effects Mileage O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls
Number of Competitors -43.306∗∗∗ -21.297∗∗∗ -6.720∗∗∗ -6.208∗∗∗ -7.687∗∗∗
(2.034) (1.524) (1.845) (1.767) (1.637)
Jet Fuel Cost 1.899∗∗∗ 2.096∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.135) (0.162) (0.152) (0.156)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 1.952∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.074) (0.057) (0.053) (0.049)
Capacity Factor -94.830∗∗∗ 42.812∗∗∗ 43.041∗∗∗ 31.354∗∗∗
(7.354) (6.662) (8.647) (8.545)
Thousand KM, Avg 52.711∗∗∗ 83.426∗∗∗ 71.752∗∗∗ 84.395∗∗∗
(2.541) (2.693) (2.523) (3.070)
Distance Squared -5.782∗∗∗ -3.955∗∗∗ -3.715∗∗∗ -4.199∗∗∗
(0.255) (0.168) (0.145) (0.156)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Num Stops Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No No No Yes
R squared 0.483 0.621 0.759 0.772 0.778
Observations 169394 169394 169394 169394 156573
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination-
number of stops level. For example, one observation is all non-stop passengers traveling from
Sydney to Melbourne on Qantas in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level,
and at least 1% market share is required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD.
Standard errors are clustered at the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights
are assigned according to the number of passengers in an observation.
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Table 3.5: Regression Results: Only Non-Stop Flights
Weighted by Number of Passengers
No Fixed Effects Mileage O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls Route FE
Number of Competitors -42.538∗∗∗ -21.324∗∗∗ -8.621∗∗∗ -8.847∗∗∗ -10.889∗∗∗ -5.824∗∗
(2.230) (1.567) (1.739) (1.851) (1.833) (2.394)
Jet Fuel Cost 1.493∗∗∗ 1.704∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.145) (0.165) (0.148) (0.160) (0.167)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 2.108∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.078) (0.063) (0.065) (0.064) (0.080)
Capacity Factor -87.317∗∗∗ 45.896∗∗∗ 44.476∗∗∗ 33.296∗∗∗ 56.050∗∗∗
(7.325) (6.459) (8.525) (8.374) (8.211)
Thousand KM, Avg 50.714∗∗∗ 69.406∗∗∗ 68.161∗∗∗ 84.977∗∗∗
(2.929) (3.360) (3.108) (3.717)
Distance Squared -5.760∗∗∗ -2.635∗∗∗ -2.921∗∗∗ -4.672∗∗∗
(0.285) (0.522) (0.485) (0.423)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R squared 0.469 0.622 0.765 0.771 0.778 0.825
Observations 47739 47739 47739 47739 41495 41459
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination-
number of stops level. For example, one observation is all non-stop passengers traveling from
Sydney to Melbourne on Qantas in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level,
and at least 1% market share is required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD.
Standard errors are clustered at the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights
are assigned according to the number of passengers in an observation. Only non-stop flights are
included.
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Table 3.6: Regression Results: Only One-Stop Flights
Weighted by Number of Passengers
No Fixed Effects Mileage O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls Route FE
Number of Competitors -107.812∗∗∗ -36.427∗∗∗ 7.511∗∗ 6.263∗ 6.187∗∗ 6.941∗∗
(7.125) (3.091) (3.391) (3.189) (2.969) (3.011)
Jet Fuel Cost 2.052∗∗∗ 2.083∗∗∗ 1.573∗∗∗ 1.741∗∗∗ 1.698∗∗∗ 1.516∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.147) (0.194) (0.195) (0.200) (0.240)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 1.954∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ -0.037 0.003 -0.027 -0.031
(0.117) (0.064) (0.077) (0.069) (0.064) (0.074)
Capacity Factor 9.241 183.269∗∗∗ 186.846∗∗∗ 203.139∗∗∗ 204.813∗∗∗
(25.291) (23.743) (26.837) (28.363) (34.890)
Thousand KM, Avg 76.301∗∗∗ 85.328∗∗∗ 71.400∗∗∗ 68.159∗∗∗ 19.573∗∗
(3.136) (2.952) (3.091) (3.180) (7.496)
Distance Squared -5.138∗∗∗ -4.843∗∗∗ -4.510∗∗∗ -4.390∗∗∗ -4.722∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.234) (0.212) (0.203) (0.832)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R squared 0.367 0.527 0.703 0.710 0.711 0.756
Observations 86549 86549 86549 86549 81349 81349
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination-
number of stops level. For example, one observation is all one-stop passengers traveling from
Sydney to Melbourne on Qantas in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level,
and at least 1% market share is required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD.
Standard errors are clustered at the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights
are assigned according to the number of passengers in an observation. Only one-stop flights are
included.
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Table 3.7: Regression Results: Including Capacity Interaction
Weighted by Number of Passengers
No Fixed Effects Mileage O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls Route FE
Number of Competitors -40.981∗∗∗ -24.651∗∗∗ -7.241∗∗∗ -7.984∗∗∗ -10.094∗∗∗ -4.945∗∗
(1.964) (1.713) (1.998) (1.849) (1.791) (2.378)
Jet Fuel Cost 0.205 1.853∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗ 0.430 -0.080 0.346
(0.421) (0.420) (0.249) (0.283) (0.296) (0.290)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 1.878∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.101) (0.065) (0.060) (0.059) (0.078)
Capacity Factor -121.185∗∗∗ -120.823∗∗∗ 32.249∗∗∗ 19.947∗∗∗ -5.347 33.810∗∗∗
(11.562) (10.405) (5.837) (7.431) (7.623) (6.735)
Jet Fuel * Capacity 2.737∗∗∗ 1.729∗∗∗ 0.508 0.956∗∗ 1.459∗∗∗ 1.002∗∗
(0.623) (0.398) (0.313) (0.388) (0.407) (0.380)
Thousand KM, Avg 32.928∗∗∗ 72.347∗∗∗ 59.457∗∗∗ 75.683∗∗∗ 81.885∗∗∗
(4.402) (3.478) (3.164) (3.729) (10.929)
Distance Squared -6.125∗∗∗ -1.329∗∗ -1.262∗∗ -2.553∗∗∗ -12.273∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.571) (0.525) (0.507) (2.046)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Num Stops Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R squared 0.511 0.539 0.768 0.785 0.791 0.834
Observations 112965 112965 112965 112965 102297 102168
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination level.
For example, one observation is all passengers traveling from Sydney to Melbourne on Qantas
in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least 1% market share is
required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors are clustered at
the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights are assigned according to the
number of passengers on a route.
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Table 3.8: Regression Results: Economy Class
Weighted by Number of Passengers
No Fixed Effects Mileage O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls Route FE
Number of Competitors -41.474∗∗∗ -23.007∗∗∗ -6.177∗∗∗ -7.082∗∗∗ -8.809∗∗∗ -3.905∗
(2.066) (1.717) (1.846) (1.666) (1.618) (2.137)
Jet Fuel Cost 1.987∗∗∗ 3.405∗∗∗ 1.081∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.305) (0.204) (0.184) (0.190) (0.207)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 1.954∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.094) (0.062) (0.056) (0.055) (0.071)
Capacity Factor -92.753∗∗∗ 42.355∗∗∗ 42.842∗∗∗ 30.875∗∗∗ 61.161∗∗∗
(13.766) (6.336) (8.513) (8.542) (8.461)
Thousand KM, Avg 29.624∗∗∗ 69.203∗∗∗ 56.693∗∗∗ 71.857∗∗∗ 72.093∗∗∗
(4.199) (3.286) (2.960) (3.374) (10.848)
Distance Squared -6.632∗∗∗ -1.740∗∗∗ -1.641∗∗∗ -2.941∗∗∗ -11.240∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.522) (0.475) (0.445) (2.058)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Num Stops Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R squared 0.466 0.510 0.752 0.767 0.772 0.820
Observations 118779 118779 118779 118779 107798 107665
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination-cabin
class level. For example, one observation is all economy class passengers traveling from Sydney to
Melbourne on Qantas in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least
1% market share is required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors
are clustered at the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights are assigned
according to the number of passengers in an observation. Only economy class fares are included.
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Table 3.9: Regression Results: Business Class
Weighted by Number of Passengers
No Fixed Effects Mileage O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls Route FE
Number of Competitors 51.242∗∗∗ 53.108∗∗∗ 17.472∗ 19.260∗∗ 21.794∗∗ 7.830
(9.801) (11.281) (9.640) (9.117) (9.193) (8.970)
Jet Fuel Cost 5.154∗∗∗ 3.490∗∗∗ 1.547∗∗∗ 1.939∗∗∗ 1.836∗∗∗ 1.266∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.387) (0.313) (0.294) (0.274) (0.282)
Jet Fuel * Competitors -1.001∗∗∗ -1.030∗∗∗ -0.376∗∗ -0.253 -0.119 0.171
(0.277) (0.286) (0.186) (0.178) (0.184) (0.189)
Capacity Factor -61.559 153.183∗∗∗ 173.284∗∗∗ 19.089 37.058
(46.916) (43.106) (33.200) (32.630) (35.287)
Thousand KM, Avg 110.075∗∗∗ 132.126∗∗∗ 100.710∗∗∗ 82.358∗∗∗ 747.071∗∗∗
(13.642) (11.117) (11.492) (13.327) (135.109)
Distance Squared -6.241∗∗ 3.153∗ 1.199 9.324∗∗∗ -109.966∗∗∗
(2.592) (1.824) (1.936) (2.160) (17.755)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Num Stops Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R squared 0.607 0.628 0.743 0.772 0.792 0.830
Observations 22725 22725 22725 22725 21405 21301
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination-cabin
class level. For example, one observation is all business class passengers traveling from Sydney to
Melbourne on Qantas in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least
1% market share is required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors
are clustered at the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights are assigned
according to the number of passengers in an observation. Only business class fares are included.
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3.6 Conclusion
Our main result is that pass-through rates in the Australian airline industry are very high and
increase with the amount of competition and the capacity factor of a route. While it is unusual to
have both results simultaneously, they are possible in this industry due to the presence of multi-
product firms and heterogeneous consumers, as shown through our simulation study. We also find
that product differentiation leads to important heterogeneity in the pass-through rate. The amount
of competition on a route has a large effect on pass-through for non-stop flights, but it plays almost
no role on one-stop routes. The results generally suggest that a carbon tax on the airline industry
would be over-shifted onto consumers.
In this paper, we have presented reduced-form evidence on heterogeneity in pass-through rates
across different products and markets. In future work, we will estimate demand for different con-
sumer groups, as well as airline pricing and capacity decisions, to better disentangle the various
forces at play. This will allow us to estimate changes in welfare due to changes in jet fuel prices and
a carbon tax. Additionally, we will calculate changes in emissions that result from such policies.
Overall, the results presented here underscore the importance of taking industry-specific condi-
tions into account when estimating pass-through. The likely effects of various policies will greatly
depend on pre-existing market structure; intuition from simpler models will not always carry over
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A.1 Data Sources and Identification of Firms and Individuals
Records on lotteries were scanned from paper records at the BLM office in Laramie Wyoming.
These records include first information on parcels that would be offered in the lottery, with an
example from June 1975 in Figure A.1. These records also contain information on the first-,
second-, and third-place winners as well as the total number of entries. The first place winner
has information both on name as well as address; the second- and third-place winners only have
names.
This data is publicly available from the Wyoming BLM. The Michigan IRB panel ruled that
this data is not regulated.
Data were double-blind entered using a data digitization service and are guaranteed to be
99.95% accurate.
We identify firms from whether words such as “Co.”, “Corp. ”, “Corporation”, “Co.”, “Inc. ”,
“Ltd.”, “Limited ”, “Associates”, “Oil”, “Gas”, and “Industries”appear in the name of the winner.
We also include as firms those that are obviously firms but not easily categorized from this rule
(for example, “Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line”).
We also explicitly list first-place individuals as individuals rather than firms even if their ad-
dress information suggests that they are associated with a firm (e.g., John Doe, Acme Co., Acme
Wyoming 80000) We do this for two reasons. First, if these individuals had appeared as second- or
third-place winners, we would not observe the address/firm information, and we would categorize
them as individuals. Second, we cannot determine whether these individuals were entering the lot-
tery on behalf of the firm or merely using the firm as a personal address. To the extent that this is
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an issue, our analysis will misclassify individuals as firms. We reviewed the winners in our sample
and did not find evidence that individuals entering on behalf of firms was widespread. Because our
dependent variable is binary, any such errors will attenuate our coefficients towards zero.
A.2 Additional Reassignment Analysis
This section presents additional reassignment analysis. Table A.1 presents regression results using
Equation 1.1 to analyze the time until initial lease reassignment. Table A.2 demonstrates that
reassignment generally preceded drilling.
Table A.1: Regression Results: Lease Transfers, Restricted Sample












Firm in first place -0.223∗∗∗ -0.005 0.008∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.030) (0.005) (0.028)
Nearby Production
Flag 0.027 -0.003 0.004 -0.029
(0.038) (0.031) (0.007) (0.035)
Firm/Nearby Prod
Interaction -0.040 -0.031 0.012 0.056
(0.053) (0.063) (0.017) (0.069)
Offers &
Acreage Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lottery Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.157 0.040 0.047 0.145
Observations 1692 1692 1692 1692
Notes: Regressions for restricted sample where there was exactly one firm among the three win-
ners. The first column dependent variable is whether the lease was transferred within 0-1 years of
the start. The second column variable is whether it was transferred for the first time within 2-10
years. The third column is whether it was transferred for the first time more than 10 years after
start date. And the fourth column is an indicator for whether it never was transferred. For each of
these specifications, leases that do not appear in the LR2000 are omitted.
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Table A.2: Regression Results: Drilling Before Reassignment
Drilling Production P | D
Firm Winner 0.008 0.007 0.181
(0.008) (0.005) (0.224)
Nearby Production Flag (2.6 Miles) 0.039∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.010
(0.013) (0.008) (0.200)
Firm/Nearby Prod Interaction 0.002 0.015 0.115
(0.026) (0.017) (0.246)
intercept 0.010∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.444∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.176)
R squared 0.013 0.011 0.063
Observations 1692 1692 36
A: All parcels, including never reassigned, restricted sample
Drilling Production P | D
Firm Winner 0.011 0.007 0.183
(0.007) (0.005) (0.141)
Nearby Production Flag (2.6 Miles) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.122
(0.005) (0.004) (0.085)
Firm/Nearby Prod Interaction 0.005 0.017 0.092
(0.021) (0.014) (0.305)
intercept 0.004 -0.011∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.002) (0.117)
R squared 0.025 0.019 0.405
Observations 10191 10191 184
B: All parcels, including never reassigned, full sample
Notes: This table examines the probability of drilling and production activity prior to initial reas-
signment. Panel A uses our restricted sample, while panel B uses the full sample. Both panels are
limited to leases with LR2000 data.
98
A.3 Full Sample Analogues to Primary Results
This section presents the full sample analogues to our primary results about nearby production,
which use our restricted sample. Figure A.2 is analogous to Figure 1.4, Table A.3 is analogous to
Table 1.5, and Figure A.3 is analogous to Figure 1.5.
Table A.3: Regression Results: Main Results, Full Sample




to Reassign Drill Prod P | D
Nearby Production
Flag 0.017 -0.070 0.111∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.079∗
(0.014) (0.073) (0.026) (0.011) (0.046)
Firm Winner -0.211∗∗∗ 0.875∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.000 -0.074
(0.026) (0.086) (0.011) (0.005) (0.069)
Firm/Nearby Prod
Interaction -0.056 0.219 -0.083∗∗∗ -0.029 0.092
(0.056) (0.176) (0.026) (0.018) (0.116)
Offers &
Acreage Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lottery Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.130 0.123 0.078 0.061 0.151
Observations 10762 8097 10762 10762 904
Notes: This table uses the probability of reassignment by twelve years (1), length of time given
reassignment (2), probability of drilling by twelve years (3), probability of production by twelve
years (4), and probability of production given drilling by twelve years (5) as dependent variables.
Nearby production is a binary indicator for any production within 2.6 miles of the section(s) the
lease is located on. This table uses our full sample. Column (2) does not correct for selection into
reassignment. Point estimates using a Heckman two-step are similar.
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Figure A.2: Full Sample Results: Leases with Nearby Production
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Full sample using observables to control for endogenous entry. Estimates are reported for
parcels with nearby production. The firm effect is the sum of the coefficient on an indicator for
whether the first place winner was a firm, plus the coefficient on an interaction between the firm
winner indicator and an indicator for nearby production. The right vertical axis gives the p value
of a test that the two means are not equal.
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Figure A.3: Full Sample Results: Leases without Nearby Production
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Full sample using observables to control for endogenous entry. Estimates are reported for
parcels without nearby production. The firm effect is the coefficient on an indicator for whether
the first place winner was a firm. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test that the two
means are not equal.
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A.4 Alternative Nearby Production Specifications
In this appendix we consider a variety of alternative nearby production specifications. Figures A.4
and A.5 define nearby production as occurring over the last 10 years. Figures A.6 and A.7 define
nearby production as occurring within 1.7 miles. Figures A.8 and A.9 define nearby production as
occurring within 3.2 miles. Figures A.10 and A.11 use an alternate data source that includes pro-
ductive gas wells and defines recent by the first production year, not the drilling year. Figures A.12
and A.13 repeat the exercise in Figures A.10 and A.11, but define nearby production as occurring
within 3.2 miles. Our central results about nearby production are broadly consistent over this range
of alternative specifications.
Figures A.14 and A.15 look at nearby drilling instead of nearby production. We limit “nearby”
to only include the closest 1.7 miles as well over half of leases have had unsuccessful wells within
2.6 miles. The results are qualitatively similar to our main results, though the magnitudes are
smaller and not always statistically significant. This finding is unsurprising. Unproductive wells
will have two important differences from productive ones. First, the owner of an unproductive
well will be less eager to purchase nearby leases – they have already determined that the area is
dry. Second, the information asymmetry from an unproductive well is likely not as large. Both
parties will be able to agree that the nearby firm has not found oil – considerably easier than
agreeing about the quantity and quality of production from a nearby producing well. As the quality
of information causing information asymmetry decreases, the negative effects from information
asymmetry should dissipate.
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Figure A.4: Restricted Sample Results: Longer Nearby Production Window
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Restricted sample limited to cases where exactly one firm appeared among the first-,
second-, and third-place winners. The firm effect is the coefficient on an indicator for whether
the first place winner was a firm plus an interaction effect for nearby production and the firm ef-
fect. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test that the two means are not equal. Panel
(c) excludes month-of-lottery fixed effects due to the small sample size of this specification. This
differs from our primary specification by allowing nearby production to occur over the 10 years
preceding a lease.
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Figure A.5: Full Sample Results: Longer Nearby Production Window
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Full sample, relying on controls to eliminate bias from endogenous entry. The firm effect
is the coefficient on an indicator for whether the first place winner was a firm plus an interaction
effect for nearby production and the firm effect. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test
that the two means are not equal. This differs from our primary specification by allowing nearby
production to occur over the 10 years preceding a lease.
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Figure A.6: Restricted Sample Results: Tighter Nearby Definition
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Restricted sample limited to cases where exactly one firm appeared among the first-,
second-, and third-place winners. The firm effect is the coefficient on an indicator for whether
the first place winner was a firm plus an interaction effect for nearby production and the firm ef-
fect. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test that the two means are not equal. Panel
(c) excludes month-of-lottery fixed effects due to the small sample size of this specification. This
differs from our primary specification by defining nearby production as occurring within 1.7 miles
of a lease.
105
Figure A.7: Full Sample Results: Tighter Nearby Definition
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Full sample, relying on controls to eliminate bias from endogenous entry. The firm effect
is the coefficient on an indicator for whether the first place winner was a firm plus an interaction
effect for nearby production and the firm effect. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test
that the two means are not equal. This differs from our primary specification by defining nearby
production as occurring within 1.7 miles of a lease.
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Figure A.8: Restricted Sample Results: Looser Nearby Definition
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Restricted sample limited to cases where exactly one firm appeared among the first-,
second-, and third-place winners. The firm effect is the coefficient on an indicator for whether
the first place winner was a firm plus an interaction effect for nearby production and the firm ef-
fect. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test that the two means are not equal. Panel
(c) excludes month-of-lottery fixed effects due to the small sample size of this specification. This
differs from our primary specification by defining nearby production as occurring within 3.2 miles
of a lease.
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Figure A.9: Full Sample Results: Looser Nearby Definition
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Full sample, relying on controls to eliminate bias from endogenous entry. The firm effect
is the coefficient on an indicator for whether the first place winner was a firm plus an interaction
effect for nearby production and the firm effect. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test
that the two means are not equal. This differs from our primary specification by defining nearby
production as occurring within 3.2 miles of a lease.
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Figure A.10: Restricted Sample Results: Including Gas Production
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Restricted sample limited to cases where exactly one firm appeared among the first-,
second-, and third-place winners. The firm effect is the coefficient on an indicator for whether
the first place winner was a firm plus an interaction effect for nearby production and the firm ef-
fect. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test that the two means are not equal. Panel
(c) excludes month-of-lottery fixed effects due to the small sample size of this specification. This
differs from our primary specification by using an alternate data source that includes productive
gas wells and defines recent by the first production year, not the drilling year.
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Figure A.11: Full Sample Results: Including Gas Production
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Full sample, relying on controls to eliminate bias from endogenous entry. The firm effect
is the coefficient on an indicator for whether the first place winner was a firm plus an interaction
effect for nearby production and the firm effect. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test
that the two means are not equal. This differs from our primary specification by using an alternate
data source that includes productive gas wells and defines recent by the first production year, not
the drilling year.
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Figure A.12: Restricted Sample Results: Including Gas Production & Looser Nearby Definition
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Restricted sample limited to cases where exactly one firm appeared among the first-,
second-, and third-place winners. The firm effect is the coefficient on an indicator for whether
the first place winner was a firm plus an interaction effect for nearby production and the firm ef-
fect. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test that the two means are not equal. Panel
(c) excludes month-of-lottery fixed effects due to the small sample size of this specification. This
differs from our primary specification by using an alternate data source that includes productive
gas wells and defines recent by the first production year, not the drilling year, and defining nearby
as within 3.2 miles.
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Figure A.13: Full Sample Results: Including Gas Production & Looser Nearby Definition
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Full sample, relying on controls to eliminate bias from endogenous entry. The firm effect
is the coefficient on an indicator for whether the first place winner was a firm plus an interaction
effect for nearby production and the firm effect. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test
that the two means are not equal. This differs from our primary specification by using an alternate
data source that includes productive gas wells and defines recent by the first production year, not
the drilling year, and defining nearby as within 3.2 miles.
112
Figure A.14: Restricted Sample Results: Including Gas Production & Tighter Nearby Definition
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Restricted sample limited to cases where exactly one firm appeared among the first-,
second-, and third-place winners. The firm effect is the coefficient on an indicator for whether
the first place winner was a firm plus an interaction effect for nearby production and the firm ef-
fect. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test that the two means are not equal. Panel
(c) excludes month-of-lottery fixed effects due to the small sample size of this specification. This
differs from our primary specification by defining nearby production as all wells drilled within 1.7
miles.
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Figure A.15: Full Sample Results: Including Gas Production & Tighter Nearby Definition
(a) Drilling (b) Production
(c) Production Given Drilling
Notes: Full sample, relying on controls to eliminate bias from endogenous entry. The firm effect
is the coefficient on an indicator for whether the first place winner was a firm plus an interaction
effect for nearby production and the firm effect. The right vertical axis gives the p value of a test
that the two means are not equal. This differs from our primary specification by defining nearby
production as all wells drilled within 1.7 miles.
114
A.5 Drilling Durations and Production Quantities
This appendix includes regressions that look at drilling durations and production quantities. Be-
cause many drilling rigs are rented out by the day, the number of days spent drilling is a rough
proxy for drilling costs. Production quantities are a rough proxy for revenue. Due to the highly
variable nature of these measures, our results are not precise. Table A.4 presents the results of this
analysis.
The first row shows that drilling time (Columns 1 & 2) and production quantities (Columns 3 &
4 ) do not have statistically significant differences depending on the initial lease winner’s identity.
The point estimates suggest firms had lower average production, but they are insignificant; we do
not interpret them as meaningful. We do not have a reason to expect that these types of wells would
have lower quantities produced.1
The third row looks at how drilling time and production quantities differ by winner’s identity
in the presence of nearby production. Again, the point estimates are not statistically significant.
Point estimates suggest that leases won by firms produce relatively larger quantities. This would
be consistent with information asymmetry decreasing the frequency of marginal wells, but these
results are difficult to interpret in the context of the coefficients from the first row. Taken together,
we do not believe we have enough precision for this set of results to be substantively interpreted.
1One explanation could be crowding out. However, leases won by firms do not appear to have drilled wells more
frequently.
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Table A.4: Regression Results: Drilling Times & Production Quantities











Firm Winner -0.287 -0.060 -1.345 -1.080
(0.251) (0.231) (1.391) (0.834)
Nearby Production
Flag -0.207 -0.006 -0.244 0.274
(0.159) (0.088) (0.810) (0.306)
Firm/Nearby Prod
Interaction 0.051 0.009 1.174 0.405
(0.323) (0.355) (1.404) (1.064)
Full Sample No Yes No Yes
Offers &
Acreage Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lottery Fixed
Effects No Yes No Yes
R squared 0.089 0.113 0.195 0.237
Observations 156 1241 91 635
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 look at the length of time it takes to drill an oil well. Durations longer
than 180 days or less than 1 day are excluded because they indicate a data error or that there was
likely a stoppage in the middle of drilling. Columns 3 and 4 look at oil production on productive
wells. Columns 1 and 3 use our restricted sample with exactly one firm winner. Columns 2 and
4 use our full sample, relying on our controls to correct for endogenous entry. All specifications
look at wells drilled within twelve years of the lease date.
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A.6 Alternative Nearby Producing Firm Trades Analysis
This appendix includes an alternative set of nearby trades. In contrast to our preferred specification,
we only include trades that happened before any wells are drilled on a lease and before twelve years
have elapsed. Results are similar to those in our preferred specification, Table 1.6.





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Winner -0.054∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.023 0.001
(0.026) (0.016) (0.023) (0.019)
intercept 0.047∗ 0.030 0.041∗ -0.002
(0.025) (0.020) (0.023) (0.013)
Full Sample No Yes No Yes
Offers &
Acreage Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lottery Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
R squared 0.024 0.019 0.038 0.013
Observations 376 2399 443 2644
Notes: We examine how frequently leases are reassigned to firms that have nearby production.
Column (1) uses our restricted sample and Column (2) uses the full sample. Columns (3) and (4)
look at how frequently leases are reassigned to distant firms with production in the area. A pooled
regression testing whether the ‘Firm Winner’ coefficient is different in columns (1) and (3) yields
a p-value of 0.363. A pooled regression testing whether the ‘Firm Winner’ coefficient is different
in columns (2) and (4) yields a p-value of 0.038. This differs from our preferred specification by





B.1 Variation in Gas Price Data
Much of the short-term variation in the price of natural gas is driven by demand shocks due to
changes in temperature or forecasted temperature. Home heating is the largest natural gas demand
source in the United States. During especially cold winters, gas use and gas prices rise. The
reverse is true during warmer winters. To understand this relationship, I use seven-day average
future continental US heating degree days (HDD) provided by the National Weather Service. I use
continental (as opposed to interconnection-level) HDD because the natural gas market is national
– very cold temperatures in the Northeast will cause gas prices in Texas to increase.
This analysis does not capture the full effect of forecasted temperature on natural gas prices.
However, it does show that the relationship is strong. Future heating degree days will not capture
gas price variation caused by unusually warm temperatures (which cause electricity demand to
increase, increasing gas demand). Additionally, I am using actual future HDD as a proxy for
forecasted HDD. Note that this analysis does not include variation caused by short-run supply
changes.
I now conduct a Frisch-Waugh decomposition to better understand the variation in the gas price
data. Specifically, I regress the residuals from each of the following equations on each other:
PNGt = α0 + s(Q
E
t ) + 1{PNGt > med(PNGt )} ∗ s(QEt ) + s(Renewablest)
+ s(HDDcurrentt ) + s(CDD
current
t ) + s(Datet) + γDm + εt (B.1)
118
HDDfuturet = α0 + s(Q
E
t ) + 1{PNGt > med(PNGt )} ∗ s(QEt ) + s(Renewablest)
+ s(HDDcurrentt ) + s(CDD
current
t ) + s(Datet) + γDm + εt (B.2)
The dependent variables here are the same as those in equation 2.2. Once I control for seasonal
variation, time trends, renewable generation, and electricity demand, I am able to look at how
residual variation in weather forecasts affects variation in the price of natural gas. My standard
errors are calculated as in other parts of the paper; I use a Newey-West specification with seven
lags.
Figure B.1 displays this relationship for selected hours. Even though the average future conti-
nental HDD is a crude measure of the effect of weather on gas prices, the relationship is still strong.
Forecasts with above expectation HDD (that is, unusually cold days) are associated with gas prices
that are above expectation. Similarly, unusually warm days are associated with gas prices that are
below expectation. This is the relationship that I expect. All 72 interconnection-hour combinations
are significant at the 10% level; the t-statistics range between 1.78 and 3.43. Six t-statistics fall
between 1.78 and the 5% threshold of 1.96; all six are in the Texas interconnection.
B.2 Alternative Construction Regressions
This section expands on the construction regressions in section 2.3.1. I first present the data in
scatterplot form and include a line of best fit (Figure B.2). The relationship appears negatively
correlated for both sources of estimated construction starts data.
I also present alternative specifications that have leads of between 12 and 36 months. I use a
minimum 12-month lead, which is shorter than an 18-month construction period, to capture the
fact that some paused construction could have been restarted with the advent of cheaper natural
gas. The EIA-860 micro data supports this possibility; many projects are listed as “Indefinitely
Postponed.”1 It is highly likely that some of these postponed projects were continued after gas
prices dropped. I use a maximum 36-month lead because it is the longest planned construction
duration for a gas-fired power plant. Additionally, my data does not allow me to analyze longer-
term construction effects.
I consider both logged and raw construction starts as the independent variable. Tables B.1
and B.2 display the results of alternative specifications. Columns [2] and [7] of Table B.2 are my
preferred specifications.
1The results using AEO data with a 12-month lead and a logged dependent variable do not strongly support this
possibility.
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Figure B.1: Frisch-Waugh Analysis of Variation
(a) Eastern: 2:00 AM (Off-Peak) (b) Eastern: 6:00 PM (Peak)
(c) Western: 2:00 AM (Off-Peak) (d) Western: 6:00 PM (Peak)
















































































Figure B.2: Gas Prices and Estimated Construction Starts
(a) Estimated EIA-860 Construction Starts (b) Estimated AEO Construction Starts
B.3 Primary Specification Fit
Figure B.3 displays scatter plots for each interconnection with a 45◦ line. It maps actual carbon
emissions against carbon emissions predicted by my primary specification. The relationship is
very strong and most points are very close to the 45◦ line. There does not appear to be any bias at
the aggregate level.
B.4 Alternative Gas Prices
This paper uses natural gas prices at Henry Hub, the major US trading location in southern
Louisiana. Using Henry Hub gas prices has several advantages. Henry Hub has been a consis-
tent trading location for decades and most other locations trade with prices marked to Henry Hub.
In contrast, many other hubs have thin trading at some times and/or can change exact terms and
locations of delivery over time. Additionally, it provides a benchmark that allows for easy inter-
pretation of the results and extrapolation. While Eastern and Texas gas prices are very closely
linked to Henry Hub, Western gas prices occasionally are out of sync. This subsection analyzes
the Western interconnection using gas prices at SoCal Gas, a major trading hub in California.
Figure B.4 plots gas prices at Henry Hub (in the Eastern interconnection), Katy (in Texas),
and SoCal (in the WECC). Generally, the three prices closely track each other, though SoCal is a
looser fit. In particular, late 2008 saw SoCal deviate from the Henry Hub/Katy price. The daily
correlation between Henry Hub and Katy gas prices is .996, while the daily correlation between
123
Figure B.3: Actual Emissions vs. Predicted Emissions
(a) Eastern Interconnection (b) Western Interconnection
(c) Texas Interconnection
Henry Hub and SoCal is .973.
I rerun my analysis with the only change being the different gas price for the Western inter-
connection. Figure B.5 highlights two of the key results. The gas price spline in panel (a) looks
similar to the spline using Henry Hub prices in Figure 2.7. Counterfactual emissions estimates
in panel (b) look similar to counterfactual estimates using Henry Hub prices in Figure 2.8. Total
2013 reductions using prices at SoCal for the Western interconnection are estimated at 15.5 thou-
sand tons/hour. Using Henry Hub gas prices for all interconnections, total 2013 reductions are
estimated at 16.7 million tons/hour. The difference is primarily driven by the fact that late 2008
gas prices at SoCal were lower than at Henry Hub. Additionally, the end of 2013 saw higher prices
at SoCal than at Henry Hub.
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Figure B.4: Seven-Day Moving Average Gas Prices
Figure B.5: Western Interconnection using Gas Prices at SoCal Trading Hub
(a) WECC 6:00 PM (Peak) (b) WECC Counterfactuals using SoCal Prices
B.5 Inclusion of Coal Prices
Coal prices are an important component of the electricity market. While my preferred specification
omits them because natural gas prices influence coal prices, I consider them here. I use data from
the EIA’s Short-Term Energy Outlook. The EIA constructs an average price for coal delivered to
electricity plants across the country. I use the delivered price because trading hubs are generally
not close to coal-fired generators.
Coal is very expensive to transport, so the spot price in, e.g., Central Appalachia does a poor job
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of approximating the marginal cost of burning coal for most generators (Cicala, 2014). Delivered
coal prices are only available on a monthly basis. This should not be a problem because most
coal contracts are medium-term and coal generators are not easily able to resell coal on the spot
market because of the transportation costs.2 Figure B.6 plots the monthly average delivered coal
price from 2007 to 2013.3 I include the seven-day average Henry Hub spot price of natural gas for
comparison. Delivered coal prices are much more stable than natural gas prices.
Figure B.6: Average Delivered Coal Prices Compared to Gas Prices
Specifically, I estimate:




t ) + s(Q
E
t ) + 1{PNGt > med(PNGt )} ∗ s(QEt ) + s(Renewablest)
+ s(HDDt) + s(CDDt) + s(Datet) + γDm + εt (B.3)
When estimating counterfactual emissions, I estimate all emissions as if both 2008 gas prices
and 2008 coal prices were realized in every other year. Figure B.7 shows the resulting gas/coal
price ratio splines for the Eastern and Western interconnections at 6:00 PM. I omit the Texas inter-
connection (as well as other parts of analysis) for brevity; omitted results look similar to my pri-
mary specification. Delivered coal prices were fairly constant at a little more than $2/MMBtu dur-
2Coal plants adjust production by storing inventory at low cost and purchasing less coal in future contracts.
3Delivered coal prices are reported at the monthly level.
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Figure B.7: Results using a Gas/Coal Price Ratio
(a) Eastern Price Ratio Spline: 6:00 PM (b) Western Price Ratio Spline: 6:00 PM
ing this time period, indicating that a price ratio of 1 usually has gas prices just above $2/MMBtu.
The splines look very similar to corresponding splines from my preferred specification in Fig-
ure 2.7.
Table B.3 displays counterfactual estimates. Results look similar to counterfactual estimates
using only gas prices in Table 2.4. Total estimated reductions in 2013 using my primary analysis are
16.7 thousand tons of carbon per hour. When I use a gas/coal price ratio, counterfactual emissions
are estimated at 16.3 thousand tons of carbon per hour (s.e. of 1.0). 2013 reductions attributable
to new plant construction are 2.1 thousand tons/hour in my primary specification, and remain 2.1
thousand tons/hour when coal prices are included (s.e. of 0.06).
127




C.1 Additional Regression Results
This appendix presents alternative regression results. Table C.1 presents results that are non-linear
in the number of competitors. Table C.2 displays results using jet fuel prices that have been lagged
by two months. Results are very similar to our primary results. Table C.3 logs the dependent
variable and fuel cost variables.
Table C.4 presents separate results during the carbon tax period and outside the carbon tax
period. There is anecdotal evidence that the imposition of the carbon tax prompted a change in the
competitive nature of the Australian airline industry.1 Regression results support this hypothesis.
Table C.5 is similar to Table 3.4, but it includes a term that interacts the cost of jet fuel and
the average capacity factor. Tables C.6 and C.7 mimic Tables 3.8 and 3.9, respectively, but they
include a term that interacts the cost of jet fuel and the average capacity factor.
1For example, see articles in The Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian Broadcast Corporation.
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Table C.1: Regression Results: Non-Linear Specification
Weighted by Number of Passengers
Base O-D FE More F-E
State/Route
Controls
Number of Competitors -4.268∗
(2.320)
Jet Fuel Cost 1.102∗∗∗ 1.252∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗ 1.044∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.203) (0.183) (0.192)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 0.251∗∗∗
(0.072)
1 Competitors -23.358∗∗∗ -30.422∗∗∗ -30.045∗∗∗
(3.254) (2.879) (3.068)
2 Competitors -23.374∗∗∗ -28.376∗∗∗ -29.338∗∗∗
(4.685) (4.045) (3.514)
3 Competitors -75.798∗∗∗ -76.816∗∗∗ -79.267∗∗∗
(6.447) (6.424) (6.927)
4 Competitors -58.215∗∗∗ -53.043∗∗∗ -64.681∗∗∗
(7.365) (7.256) (7.830)
5 Competitors 9.740 -12.629 0.131
(22.593) (23.794) (22.322)
1 Comps * Fuel Cost 0.002 0.237∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.075) (0.076)
2 Comps * Fuel Cost 0.407∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.147) (0.139)
3 Comps * Fuel Cost 1.588∗∗∗ 1.540∗∗∗ 1.544∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.170) (0.171)
4 Comps * Fuel Cost 1.571∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗ 1.327∗∗∗
(0.340) (0.338) (0.328)
5 Comps * Fuel Cost -0.709 -2.950∗∗ -3.699∗∗∗
(1.259) (1.382) (1.322)
Capacity Factor 57.264∗∗∗ 36.969∗∗∗ 35.616∗∗∗ 23.528∗∗
(8.726) (6.886) (9.129) (9.074)
Thousand KM, Avg 83.478∗∗∗ 75.226∗∗∗ 62.126∗∗∗ 77.811∗∗∗
(11.089) (3.712) (3.210) (3.720)
Distance Squared -12.834∗∗∗ -1.651∗∗∗ -1.649∗∗∗ -2.972∗∗∗
(2.108) (0.588) (0.503) (0.464)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Num Stops Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes
State/Route Controls Yes No No Yes
R squared 0.833 0.771 0.787 0.792
Observations 102168 112965 112965 102297
Notes: The dependent variable is average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination level. For
example, one observation is all passengers traveling from Sydney to Melbourne on Qantas in Jan-
uary 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least 1% market share is required
to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors are clustered at the month
level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights are assigned according to the number of
passengers in an observation.
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Table C.2: Regression Results: Jet Fuel Prices Lagged by Two Months
Weighted by Number of Passengers
No Fixed Effects Mileage O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls
Number of Competitors -42.554∗∗∗ -21.788∗∗∗ -7.008∗∗∗ -7.634∗∗∗ -9.361∗∗∗
(2.140) (1.573) (1.875) (1.708) (1.658)
Jet Fuel Cost 2.008∗∗∗ 2.367∗∗∗ 1.100∗∗∗ 1.211∗∗∗ 1.079∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.134) (0.168) (0.155) (0.161)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 1.969∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.076) (0.060) (0.054) (0.053)
Capacity Factor -97.134∗∗∗ 43.326∗∗∗ 41.460∗∗∗ 27.749∗∗∗
(7.356) (6.619) (8.720) (8.692)
Thousand KM, Avg 50.658∗∗∗ 70.964∗∗∗ 58.046∗∗∗ 73.907∗∗∗
(2.941) (3.408) (3.062) (3.497)
Distance Squared -6.475∗∗∗ -1.393∗∗ -1.369∗∗ -2.633∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.571) (0.520) (0.495)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Num Stops Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No No No Yes
R squared 0.501 0.632 0.768 0.785 0.790
Observations 112965 112965 112965 112965 102297
Notes: The dependent variable is average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination level. For
example, one observation is all passengers traveling from Sydney to Melbourne on Qantas in Jan-
uary 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least 1% market share is required
to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors are clustered at the month
level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by two months. Weights are assigned according to the number of
passengers in an observation.
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Table C.3: Regression Results: Log-Log Specification
Weighted by Number of Passengers
No Fixed Effects Mileage O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls
Number of Competitors -0.349∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022)
Log Jet Fuel Cost 0.351∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015)
Log Jet Fuel * Competitors 0.108∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Capacity Factor -0.553∗∗∗ -0.610∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.094∗
(0.050) (0.062) (0.046) (0.048)
Thousand KM, Avg 0.149∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.010) (0.016) (0.019)
Distance Squared -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Num Stops Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No No No Yes
R squared 0.447 0.570 0.609 0.725 0.728
Observations 112482 112482 112482 112482 102132
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination
level. For example, one observation is all passengers traveling from Sydney to Melbourne on
Qantas in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least 1% market share
is required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors are clustered at
the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights are assigned according to the
number of passengers in an observation.
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Table C.4: Regression Results: Inside/Outside of Carbon-Tax Period
Weighted by Number of Passengers
Base Outside Tax Tax Period
Number of Competitors -9.302∗∗∗ -5.614∗∗∗ -22.422∗∗∗
(1.696) (1.756) (2.440)
Jet Fuel Cost 1.011∗∗∗ 1.838∗∗∗ -0.568∗∗
(0.173) (0.283) (0.267)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 0.339∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.055) (0.087)
Capacity Factor 28.067∗∗∗ 25.132∗∗ 26.873∗∗
(8.716) (12.186) (9.971)
Thousand KM, Avg 75.144∗∗∗ 52.809∗∗∗ 98.615∗∗∗
(3.578) (4.545) (4.437)
Distance Squared -2.617∗∗∗ 0.370 -2.991∗∗∗
(0.493) (0.477) (0.529)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Num Stops Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State/Route Controls Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0.790 0.779 0.856
Observations 102297 65201 37096
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination level.
For example, one observation is all passengers traveling from Sydney to Melbourne on Qantas
in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least 1% market share is
required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors are clustered at
the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights are assigned according to the
number of passengers in an observation. Regression run separately for tax- and no-tax- periods.
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Table C.5: Regression Results: Observations separated by Number of Stops, Including Capacity
Interaction
Weighted by Number of Passengers
No Fixed Effects Mileage O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls
Number of Competitors -40.651∗∗∗ -21.567∗∗∗ -7.050∗∗∗ -6.575∗∗∗ -8.136∗∗∗
(1.976) (1.505) (1.906) (1.853) (1.719)
Jet Fuel Cost 0.026 1.391∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗ 0.205 -0.210
(0.336) (0.206) (0.222) (0.247) (0.255)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 1.855∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.078) (0.061) (0.057) (0.054)
Capacity Factor -123.514∗∗∗ -110.290∗∗∗ 29.345∗∗∗ 18.487∗∗ -2.966
(11.166) (6.903) (5.814) (7.187) (7.137)
Jet Fuel * Capacity 2.931∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 1.488∗∗∗
(0.533) (0.274) (0.297) (0.355) (0.371)
Thousand KM, Avg 51.758∗∗∗ 82.324∗∗∗ 69.571∗∗∗ 81.596∗∗∗
(2.716) (2.780) (2.619) (3.218)
Distance Squared -5.456∗∗∗ -3.619∗∗∗ -3.137∗∗∗ -3.407∗∗∗
(0.258) (0.182) (0.183) (0.203)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Num Stops Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No No No Yes
R squared 0.500 0.622 0.759 0.772 0.779
Observations 169394 169394 169394 169394 156573
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination-
number of stops level. For example, one observation is all non-stop passengers traveling from
Sydney to Melbourne on Qantas in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level,
and at least 1% market share is required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD.
Standard errors are clustered at the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights
are assigned according to the number of passengers in an observation.
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Table C.6: Regression Results: Economy Class, Including Capacity Interaction
Weighted by Number of Passengers
No Fixed Effects Mileage O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls Route FE
Number of Competitors -41.474∗∗∗ -23.725∗∗∗ -6.588∗∗∗ -7.638∗∗∗ -9.631∗∗∗ -4.587∗∗
(2.066) (1.644) (1.931) (1.770) (1.720) (2.202)
Jet Fuel Cost 1.987∗∗∗ 2.140∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗ 0.374 -0.098 0.274
(0.108) (0.440) (0.263) (0.289) (0.303) (0.293)
Jet Fuel * Competitors 1.954∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.102) (0.067) (0.062) (0.062) (0.078)
Capacity Factor -119.154∗∗∗ 30.708∗∗∗ 20.316∗∗∗ -2.492 38.522∗∗∗
(10.311) (5.883) (7.456) (7.747) (6.761)
Jet Fuel * Capacity 1.603∗∗∗ 0.560∗ 1.040∗∗ 1.520∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗
(0.408) (0.320) (0.395) (0.417) (0.382)
Thousand KM, Avg 29.439∗∗∗ 69.562∗∗∗ 57.082∗∗∗ 72.855∗∗∗ 71.140∗∗∗
(4.163) (3.327) (3.056) (3.531) (10.721)
Distance Squared -6.218∗∗∗ -1.691∗∗∗ -1.551∗∗∗ -2.864∗∗∗ -10.743∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.520) (0.480) (0.458) (1.996)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Num Stops Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R squared 0.466 0.513 0.752 0.768 0.773 0.821
Observations 118779 118779 118779 118779 107798 107665
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination-cabin
class level. For example, one observation is all economy class passengers traveling from Sydney to
Melbourne on Qantas in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least
1% market share is required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors
are clustered at the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights are assigned
according to the number of passengers in an observation. Only economy class fares are included.
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Table C.7: Regression Results: Business Class, Including Capacity Interaction
Weighted by Number of Passengers
No Fixed Effects Mileage O-D FE More FE
State/Route
Controls Route FE
Number of Competitors 51.242∗∗∗ 49.206∗∗∗ 20.959∗∗ 21.053∗∗ 23.195∗∗ 9.491
(9.801) (11.195) (9.898) (9.299) (9.220) (9.025)
Jet Fuel Cost 5.154∗∗∗ 2.495∗∗∗ 2.348∗∗∗ 2.398∗∗∗ 2.396∗∗∗ 2.002∗∗
(0.276) (0.871) (0.788) (0.801) (0.801) (0.842)
Jet Fuel * Competitors -1.001∗∗∗ -0.958∗∗∗ -0.436∗∗ -0.286 -0.152 0.132
(0.277) (0.288) (0.189) (0.181) (0.186) (0.190)
Capacity Factor -136.674∗∗ 221.727∗∗∗ 214.724∗∗∗ 69.937 106.288
(52.456) (46.888) (59.761) (62.031) (64.084)
Jet Fuel * Capacity 1.370 -1.131 -0.655 -0.804 -1.075
(1.118) (1.043) (1.098) (1.102) (1.175)
Thousand KM, Avg 110.942∗∗∗ 130.316∗∗∗ 99.738∗∗∗ 81.982∗∗∗ 749.425∗∗∗
(13.897) (11.408) (11.808) (13.352) (134.729)
Distance Squared -6.258∗∗ 3.436∗ 1.375 9.322∗∗∗ -110.621∗∗∗
(2.647) (1.888) (2.009) (2.157) (17.635)
Quarter-Year
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-of-Year
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Num Stops Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Airline Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
State/Route Controls No No No No Yes Yes
R squared 0.607 0.628 0.743 0.772 0.792 0.830
Observations 22725 22725 22725 22725 21405 21301
Notes: The dependent variable is the average airfare at the month-airline-origin-destination-cabin
class level. For example, one observation is all business class passengers traveling from Sydney to
Melbourne on Qantas in January 2010. Competitors are at the operating-airline level, and at least
1% market share is required to be designated a competitor. Prices are in 2010 USD. Standard errors
are clustered at the month level. Jet fuel prices are lagged by one month. Weights are assigned
according to the number of passengers in an observation. Only business class fares are included.
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